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Federal expenditures for grants-in-aid have increased tenfold in the
last two decades. Total outlays for federal aid programs, which
amounted to 2.4 billion dollars in 1951, were estimated at 27.6 billion
dollars for fiscal year 1971.1 The number and variety of federal assist-
ance programs have also expanded greatly. The most recent OEO
catalog of existing assistance programs lists 1019 domestic assistance pro-
grams administered by fifty-seven different federal departments and
agencies 2
Federal grants are of two basic varieties: formula grants and project
grants. Formula grants are distributed to all states according to a pre-
determined formula spelled out in the enabling statute. A state must
normally submit a plan for approval by the federal agency administer-
ing the program in order to qualify for its share of the funds. Formula
grants continue from year to year and provide most frequently for
* This article is based on a report prepared by the authors for the Administrative
Conference of the United States. Although the Conference adopted Recommendations
similar to those herein suggested, the views expressed in the report and this article
are those of the authors and have not been approved or adopted by the Administrative
Conference.
** Professor of Law, University of Maryland. A3., 1961, Princeton University; MA.,
1962, University of Washington; LL.B., 1965, Harvard University.
*** Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia. B.A., 1962; LLB., 1964, Tulane
University; Ph.D, 1969, University of Edinburgh.
The authors would like to express their appreciation to Joseph C. Kearfot for his
valuable assistance in putting this article in its final form.
I BUpAU OF m BDGET, SIMPLIFYING FEDERAL AID TO STATES AND CoMmuNITIS 5
(1970). The majority of grant-in-aid dollars have gone to state and local governments
and only a small percentage to private persons and institutions.
2 OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, CATALOG OF FEDERAL Domxrc ASSISTANCE PRO-
GRAMS: A DESCRIPInON OF =x FEDERAL GovnatmzEir's DoMxsrc PRoGRAMs TO AssisT
Ti-m AMERICAN PEoPl IN FURTHRING TmIR SOCIAL AND EcONOMic PRoGREsS (April;
1970). A congressional study by Representative William Roth (R., Del.) counted
each authorization as a separate program and uncovered 1315 separate federal assistance
programs. H.R. Doc. No. 19-177, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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health, education, and welfare. Because a state which has an approved
plan on file with the federal agency is entided as a matter of right to
the continued payment of its share of any funds authorized and appro-
priated by Congress for the program, formula grants are sometimes
referred to as mandatory grants.
Project grants are disbursed to eligible recipients for specific projects
on the basis of project applications. Grants for housing, urban develop-
ment, and environmental improvement are generally of the project
variety. Recipients are usually local units of government or private en-
tities rather than states, as in the case of formula grants. Project grants
rely on local initiative and local sensing of needs in requesting funds
and in following up applications. Often referred to as discretionary
grants, project grants are far more flexible than formula grants and allow
federal administrators considerable discretion in deciding which project
applications deserve funding.'
The line between formula and project grants is often blurred. The
Hill-Burton Act, for instance, authorizes HEW to make project grants
to public and private hospitals for the construction and modernization
of hospital facilities but contains also a precise formula for apportion-
ing the available funds among the states.4 Federal highway, water
quality, and many education grants similarly have both formula and
project characteristics.
Federal grants have strings attached; these strings are federal stand-
ards. They are devices for ensuring that the persons Congress intended
to benefit from a grant program actually receive the benefits. Nor-
mally, before receiving a federal grant, the prospective recipient must
demonstrate that it will comply with federal standards, either in the
project application which it must file to become eligible for a project
grant or in the plan which it must file to become eligible for a formula
grant.
The purpose of this Article is to explore some of the problems which
have arisen with respect to the enforcement of federal standards and to
recommend certain changes in federal grant procedures. While the dis-
3 For an excellent discussion of the characteristics of project and formula grants
and a comprehensive description of the existing federal grant-in-aid system, see AD-
visoRY CommaIssioN ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELAMTIONS, FISCAL BALA&cE IN TIm AMERICAN
FEDERAL SYSTEM, ch. 5 (1967).
4Project applications for local hospitals must be approved by a state agency prior
tosubmission to HEW and must be in conformity with a state plan that has been
approved by HEW, 42 U.S.C. § 291d (1970).
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cussion is cast rather broadly,5 it is not intended to cover programs
directed at stimulating research, personnel development, or demonstra-
tion projects and excludes fellowships and other grants which are made
primarily for the benefit of the grantee. Rather, we are concerned with
grants made to encourage the grantee to engage in or expand programs
benefiting third parties, such as welfare recipients, highway users, school
children, and the poor who need medical attention. Within that broad
category of grant programs, we have focused upon the program of aid
5 Among the principal grant-in-aid programs which would be covered by these
recommendations are:
a. Social assistance grants to the states under the Social Security Act for (1)
old age assistance, 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1970); (2) aid to families with
dependent children and child welfare services, 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1970);
(3) maternal and child health services, 42 U.S.C. H9 703 et seq. (1970); (4) aid
to the blind, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201 et seq. (1970); and (5) aid to the permanently
and totally disabled, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351 et seq. (1970). These are formula grants
and are administered by HEW, as are education grants under Title I of Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 US.C. § 214a (1970), and
various grants for the construction of libraries, hospitals, and educational and
vocational facilities. See generally, 20 U.S.C. (1970) and 42 U.S.C. (1970).
b. Grants and loans on a project basis to local housing authorities for the
development and acquisition of low rent public housing, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1409, 1411
(1970), and for annual contributions to local housing authorities to assist them
in achieving and maintaining the low rent character of the public housing, 42
U.S.C. § 1410 (1970); urban renewal project grants to local public agencies under
Title I of the Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. H9 1441 et seq. (1970); model cities
grants to cities, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3301 et seq. (1970); grants to states and localities
for the acquisition and preservation of open-space lands, 42 U.S.C. H§ 1500 et seq.(1970). HUD administers all of these programs.
c. Highway construction grants distributed to the states, 23 U.S.C. §§ 101 et
seq. (1970); and urban mass transportation, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (1970), and
airport planning and constitution grants, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. (1970) distrib-
uted to localities and states. Various administrations of DOT distribute these
grants.
d. Grants for the construction of waste treatment works, 33 U.S.C. § 1158(1970), and for control of air pollution, 42 U.S.C. § 1857(c) (1970), to states and
localities. The Environmental Protection Agency administers these.
e. Law enforcement grants to the states under Title I of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701 et seq. (1970). Normally,
the federal grant goes to a state crime commission which then approves applica-
tions for funds from state and local law enforcement agencies.
f. Block-type grants to the states for public health services under the Partner-
ship in Health Act of 1966,42 U.S.C. § 246 (1970).
g. Grants to public and private nonprofit organizations for antipoverty pro-
grams, e.g-, emergency food and medical services, 42 U.S.C. § 2809 (1970); legal
services, 42 U.S.C. § 2781 (1970); and community action, 42 U.S.C. § 2781 et
seq. (1970). The Office of Economic Opportunity administers these programs.
h. Grants to state employment security agencies to facilitate employment,
see generally 29 U.S.C. (1970); 42 U.S.C. (1970), and to industries and public
and nonprofit organizations to provide job training for disadvantaged youth, 42
U.S.C. S 2711 (1970). The Manpower Administration in the Department of Labor
administers these project grants.
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to families with dependent children (AFDC), the federal-aid highways
program, and urban renewal.
FEDERAL STANDARDS IN THE GRANT-IN-AID SYSTEM:
THE COMPLIANCE PROBLEM
Federal standards take a variety of forms. Some are specific and
commit the grantee to a detailed course of action, while others are
more general and require only that the grantee adopt certain goals or
take into account specified factors when making program decisions.
A general form of federal standard is necessarily involved in all federal
grant programs, because each program of federal grants-in-aid has been
developed for a particular purpose determined by Congress to be of
national concern. Federal funds must be spent by the grantee within
the confines of the particular, "categorical," assistance program. Wel-
fare funds cannot be spent for the construction of airports, and vice
versa. The enforcement of this type of federal standard has not proved
particularly difficult. Attempts to spend grant funds outside the scope
of a particular assistance program are rare, and the federal government
can respond by refusing to release matching federal funds or by seeking
restitution of federal funds that have already been so expended.
A more troublesome type of grant standard-and the type with
which this Article is primarily concerned-are standards that control
how funds are spent within a given category. These standards may be
divided conveniently into four overlapping categories. First, there are
standards that are statutory or constitutional in origin and that apply to
all or to a great number of programs of federal financial assistance.
Among the most important of these are Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,6 which proscribes racial discrimination under any program
or activity receiving federal financial assistance, and the National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1969,' which requires all federal agencies
to report on and consider the environmental impact of "major federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."
A second category consists of statutory standards which, while also
642 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1970). Another similar statutory standard is contained in the
Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq. (1970), which prohibits political activity by state
and local employees engaged in federally financed activity.
742 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1970). The term "federal actions" appears broad enough to
cover grants-in-aid. Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation
Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 400 U.S. 969 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari); Sive, Some Thoughts of an Enviromnental Lawyer in the Wilderness of
Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. Rv. 612, 643-51 (1970).
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designed to secure some general federal policy, are found in the grant
statutes themselves-frequently in formula grant programs and occa-
sionally in project grant statutes. For example, Congress normally has
insisted that each -state recipient of formula grant funds designate a
single state agency to administer the federally assisted program and
observe a merit system for employment in that agency. A common
standard for project grants is the requirement that an areawide plan
for attacking a particular problem be submitted to the federal agency
prior to the approval of any specific grants for projects in that area.8
The third and most important group of standards are those statutory
standards which apply only to a single grant program or closely related
group of programs. For example, states that receive federal highway
construction aid must hold public hearings on the routing of highways
that affect urban areas9 and must take extraordinary steps to preserve
parkland.'0 Similarly, when applying for federal assistance for aid to
needy families with dependent children, states must give assurances in
their state plans that they will comply with numerous federal standards
in operating their programs. These standards include both general
requirements, for example, that the AFDC program operate uniformly
throughout the state," and detailed provisions, such as those for dis-
regarding certain earned income of family members.' 2
A fourth and final group consists of federal standards developed by
the federal agencies themselves. These standards apply only to par-
ticular programs and appear in agency regulations, manuals, handbooks,
policy statements, forms, and other materials necessary for program
administration.'3 While the manuals contain many program policies
that are advisory only, and thus not enforceable, other administrative
requirements are clearly binding on the recipients of a grant. These
standards may go beyond what is specifically required in the statute
and depend for their validity on the federal agency's general power to
adopt rules and regulations in furtherance of the grant program. HUD's
Urban Renewal Handbook, for example, contains a myriad of stand-
ards which local public agencies must observe in such diverse activities
8See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1451(c) & (e) (1970).
9 23 U.S.C. § 128 (1970).
10 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970).
1142 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1) (1970).
1242 U.S.C. § 602(a) (8) (1970).
13 For a discussion of these various administrative tools, see Skoler, Lynch & Axilbund,
Legal and Quasi-Legal Considerations in New Federal Aid Programs, 56 GEo. LJ.
1144, 1153-57 (1968).
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as acquiring land for the project, entering into contracts for project
work, selecting private sponsors to redevelop a project area, and dis-
posing of land acquired for the project.' 4
Why Have Standards in Such Profusion?
It may appear from the mere description of the main categories of
federal grant standards that, if there is a problem with the enforcement
of federal standards, it is because there are too many of them. The
solution to the enforcement problem might, then, be in "federalizing"
programs where dominant national interests require national control
and in relaxing standards in other programs by techniques such as
block grants or special revenue sharing. A partial "federalization" of
the AFDC program has been adopted by the House of Representatives
in its recent passage of the Nixon-Mills Family Assistance Plan. 5 The
block grant approach is already used in the law enforcement area0 and
has been proposed for five other areas in the administration's special
revenue sharing proposals: transportation, 7 manpower training,'8 edu-
cation,' 9 and urban and rural community development.0
14This sort of standard has figured prominently in recent Supreme Court cases.
Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969) (HUD circular requiring confer-
ence prior to eviction held binding on local housing authority); Lewis v. Martin, 397
U.S. 552 (1970) (HEW regulation concerning resources available to a needy child
held valid).
15 Nixon-Mills Family Assistance Plan, H.R. 1, 92nd Cong, 1st Sess. (1971); CoN-
GRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERvicE, DIGEsT OF PuBLIc GENERAL BnLs Am REsoLnToNs, 92nd
Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at E-2 (1971).
16 This program is administered by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,
created by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. S 3711
(Supp. 1972). Revenue sharing amendments were proposed in the Law Enforcement
Revenue Sharing Act of 1971, H.R. 5408, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). As to the problems
of standards generally found in the revenue sharing area, see Berson, Revenue Sharing:
An Analysis of Alternative Statutory Approaches, 8 HARV. J. LEGIS. 221 (1971);
Musgrave & Polinsky, Revenue Sharing: A Critical View, 8 HARv. J. LEGIS. 197 (1971).
See also W. HELLER, Nzw DIMENSIONS OF PoLITICAL ECONOMY 147 (1966); J. PECHMrA~N,
FEDERAL TAX PoUcy 229 (1966).
17 Special Revenue Sharing Program for Transportation, H.R. Doc. 92-71, 92nd Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971), proposed in the President's Message of March 18, 1971, 117 CoNG.
REc. 1750 (1971); U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws, March 25, 1971, at 254.
18 Manpower Revenue Sharing Act of 1971, S. 1243, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
I9Education Revenue Sharing Act of 1971, S. 1669, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
See Kirp & Yudof, Revenue Sharing and Its Effect on the Poor, 5 CLEARINGHOUSE RPv.
496 (1972).
20Rural Community Revenue Sharing Act of 1971, S. 1612, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971); Urban Community Development Act of 1971, S. 1618, 92nd Cong, 1st Sess.
(1971).
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Both of these approaches harbor significant difficulties. "Federaliza-
tion" is rarely possible because of the political, administrative and fiscal
ramifications of the historic state and local involvement in these areas.
For example, the provisions of the Family Assistance Plan carve out
as federal responsibilities only a particular level of monetary support
and certain program elements directly related to the provision of
employment. A grant-in-aid program for social services to low-income
persons, and what is in effect a grant-in-aid program for state supple-
mentary payments, remain, hedged with many of the present AFDC
conditions. While block grants give the states greater authority to
determine priorities among competing needs in the broad area of the
block grant, certain federal standards, such as Title VI and the Hatch
Act, must still be complied with. There also may be specific federal
standards for individual block grant programs.2 1
The block grant or special revenue-sharing approach might still be
ideal were it not for measurement difficulties. The provision of funds
from the federal treasury for a particular state, local, or privately run
program is largely, if not always, based on a recognition of benefits
from that program which are external to the jurisdiction or geographic
area in which it will function and of external costs from state, local,
or private under-investment in the activity which is to be supported.
Ideally then, the federal government might make its grant-in-aid pay-
ments to individual grantees on the basis of calculations of the amount
of aid necessary to produce an "optimal" level of program output. The
only condition on such grants would be that the specified outputs be
achieved. The difficulty is that there are no reliable means by which
to measure external economies and diseconomies or the amount of aid
necessary to produce (in conjunction with whatever level of grantee
spending is likely to be forthcoming) optimal levels of output. Perhaps
more important is the difficulty of coming up with sensible definitions of
the "outputs" themselves which would indicate whether the grant
moneys were being appropriately expended. To take the AFDC ex-
ample, what should the state be asked to produce? Happy children?
21 Similarly, block grants remain subject to general federal standards (e.g., NEPA)
and may contain special requirements. For example, state agencies that receive block
grants for law enforcement must "pass through" at least forty per cent of the planning
money and seventy-five per cent of the action money to units of local government.
42 US.C. §5 3723(c) (1970). In addition, no more than one-third of a block grant to
a state may be expended for the compensation of personnel. 42 U.S.C. § 3731(d) (1970).
For an excellent discussion of the structuring of law enforcement block grants, see
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, MAKING TIE SAFE STREr
Acr WORK: AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL CnuEALN (1970).
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Whole families? Low illegitimacy? Productive and self-reliant adults?
A percentage reduction in "poverty"? Even if the more easily meas-
ured indicators were taken as goals, the establishment of causal rela-
tionships between a grant program and a particular and measurable
social change would be enormously difficult.2 2
The drafters of federal grant programs thus tend to be driven toward
a choice among: (1) the provision of money without standards; (2)
the utilization of "goals" or output standards which either make com-
pliance virtually impossible to estimate or which are measurable but
poor substitutes for the true purposes of the grant program; (3) "in-
put" requirements which represent the planner's best guess concerning
the necessary techniques for producing the desired results. The input
standard or condition has usually been chosen. Moreover, it is difficult
to make a convincing argument for the general relaxation of the only
type of standard which seems feasible. Standards are thought necessary
to achieve national goals, and it is in the name of these goals that fed-
eral grant-in-aid programs make very substantial redistributions of
resources among the states. According to figures developed for the
year 1966, seventeen states were in effect the net grantors, and the rest
the net grantees, of federal grant-in-aid programs.23 It would seem
politically irresponsible to make resource shifts of this magnitude with-
out some considerable exercise of control over expenditures. Hence, it
is sensible to expect that categorical grant programs with more or less
extensive federal standards or conditions will continue for some time.
Perspectives on the Development of Federal Standards
A brief look at the development of federal standards in the pro-
grams of aid to families with dependent children, urban renewal, and
federal-aid highways will reveal a central fact concerning federal grant
22See generally Olson, The Optimal Allocation of Jurisdictional Responsibility: The
Principal of "Fiscal Equivalence," in JonTr EcoNomnc Comarerrr oF Ta CONGRESS,
TIE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF PuBLIc EXPENDITURs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 321 (1969);
Mushkin & Cotton, Systematic Analysis and Grants-in-Aid in the Federal System, in
id., at 332.
2 3 Omo LEGISLATIVE SFavica CoMMISSIO-, IMPACr OF FEDERAL GRA-rs-In-AID ON OHIO
ADMINISTRATIVE PoucIEs, Staff Research Report No. 90, at 37 (1969). Earlier statistics
on (a) per capita grants-in-aid received as a percentage of per capita contributions
to grants and (b) on grants received as a percentage of total federal taxes paid revealed
that the states' percentages in these two categories varied from New Jersey's 37 per
cent to Wyoming's 459 per cent on the first scale and Delaware's 4.41 per cent to
Mississippi's 45.78 per cent on the second. REPORT OF nE VRmNA COMMIsSION ON
CONSTITUTIONAL GOvmaNENT, FEDERAL GRANrs-n-Am 67 (1961).
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policies; congressional and administrative development of grant stand-
ards has been directed primarily to solving specific problems which have
arisen over the lives of the programs. Any proposal for reform must
reckon with not only the general, a priori, but also the operationally veri-
fied necessity for the provision of federal standards in grant-in-aid pro-
grams. Moreover, this discussion, which includes a more "functional"
description of the Urban Renewal Program, will give the reader a
better feel for the substance of federal grant policies and the nature
of the interests and expectations that they may create for program
beneficiaries.
Aid to Famlies with Dependent Children
Mechanically, the AFDC program operates rather simply: funding
is based on an open-ended formula; a state qualifies for grants by the
submission of a "plan" which describes or includes the statutory and
regulatory provisions governing the state's AFDC program. AFDC
grants-in-aid to the states originated as a means for bailing out state
systems of public assistance which had collapsed during the early years
of the Great Depression. Although originally adopted by a Congress
which showed much greater interest in the other titles of the Social
Security Act, AFDC has in recent years become virtually synonymous
with "welfare" and "the welfare problem." In the process there has
been a marked increase in both statutory and regulatory federal stand-
ards to which state plans must conform.
Statutory Standards-Although Congress prescribed only general ad-
ministrative requirements in section 402 (a) of the Social Security Act
during the early years of the AFDC program, these requirements are
of some importance.2 4 For example, section 402 (a) (1) provides that the
24A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must
(1) provide that it shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the State, and,
if administered by them, be mandatory upon them;
(2) provide for financial participation by the State;(3) either provide for the establishment or designation of a single State agency
to administer the plan, or provide for the establishment or designation of a
single State agency to supervise the administration of the plan;(4) provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing before the State
agency to any individual whose claim for aid to families with dependent
children is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness;
(5) provide
(A) such methods of administration ... as are found by the Secretary to be
necessary for the proper and effective operation of the plan, and(B) for the training and effective use of paid subprofessional staff, with
particular emphasis on the full-time or part-time employment of re-
cipients and other persons of low income ...
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state plan shall be. in effect in all political subdivisions of a state. The
provision was designed to avoid the difficulties of state mother's pen-
sion laws, which President Roosevelt's Committee on Economic Secur-
ity had found to be ineffective because of their local option provisions.
2 5
The vitality of section 402 (a) (1) has remained undiminished, due to the
difficulties that face localities in virtually all public services financing and
the need for spreading financial responsibilities to even broader jurisdic-
tions. Similarly, the section 402 (a) (5) requirement of a merit system
for the selection and advancement of state welfare personnel, enacted in
response to notorious abuses experienced between 1935 and 1939,26
remains desirable as a means by which the federal government can
assure some minimum standards of professionalism in the state's admin-
istration of the program it has funded.
In 1939 the first nonadministrative conditions were imposed upon
states participating in the AFDC program. Subsection (7), which re-
quires that states take into account the income and resources of a
recipient in determining need, was added to eliminate federal funding
of some states' practices of making old age assistance grants to all of
their elderly citizens-2 Subsection (9), also added in 1939, requires
that a state plan contain provisions to safeguard the confidentiality of
information provided by applicants and recipients to state and local
welfare personnel. Although relaxed somewhat in 195 1,28 the provi-
sion still protects against the political and commercial use of welfare
rolls.
In the early 1960's, major hostilities toward AFDC developed. At
(6) provide that the State agency will make such reports, in such form and con-
taining such information, as the Secretary may from time to time require,
and comply with such provisions as the Secretary may from time to time
find necessary to assure the correctness and verification of such reports ....
42 U.S.C. S 602(a) (1) to (6) (1969).
25 Hearings on HiR. 4120 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 48 (1935).
26The Social Security Board had been forced to withdraw funds from Oklahoma,
Ohio, and Illinois in the period 1937-38. Some counties in Oklahoma had more people
on their public assistance rolls than they had residents; the Illinois financial and account-
ting procedures were virtually nonexistent; and in Ohio the state Republican leadership
had raised grants on the eve of primary elections and used the aid envelopes to distribute
campaign propaganda. Hearings on the Social Security Act Amendments of 1939
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 2396-98 (1939).
2 7 See A. ALTMEYER, Tim FoaRiAxvn YEARS OF SOCIAL SEcurry 60-61 (1968). Section
402 (a) (7) has been amended to make clear that the consideration of income and re-
sources should include those of any individual living in the home of a recipient whose
needs are considered in determining the needs of the recipient.
2842 U.S.C. S 602(e) (19) (1970).
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the state and local level these hostilities were manifested by abuses in
the application process and the creation of waiting lists for applicants.
Congress responded with section 402 (a) (10), which requires that state
plans provide for the provision of assistance with reasonable prompt-
ness to all eligible individuals. Soon thereafter, however, disenchant-
ment began to appear at the federal level, first in the increasingly articu-
late belief that AFDC was a disincentive to work and later in the widely
expressed fear that welfare fostered an intergenerational cycle of de-
pendency. Amendments to sections 402 (a) (7) and (8) responded to
the belief that AFDC was a work disincentive by requiring that states
disregard certain funds in considering income and resources, thus mak-
ing it less likely that a recipient would lose benefits were he to secure
a job. The fear of a cycle of dependency (coinciding with increased
budgetary demands of the Vietnam War) created a major Congres-
sional struggle in 1967 over proposed changes in AFDC. The results
were mandatory work training and a temporary freeze on funds for
deserted children.30
Regulatory Conditions-Federal regulations governing grant programs
are often criticized for invading the proper prerogatives of the grantees,
for being outside the authority of the grantor agency, and for con-
tributing to the problem of grantee noncompliance by their detail and
complexity. A review of the development of the AFDC regulations
suggests a somewhat different picture. Like the statutory standards,
regulatory conditions in AFDC have largely been responsive to the
practical difficulties of implementing federal policies in the face of less
than enthusiastic grantee acceptance of those policies.
Regulatory requirements implementing the conditions of section
402 (a) do tend to develop over time from broad and abstract require-
ments to more specific, objective, and measurable standards. But the
trend is neither inflexible nor without justification. The consistent
failure of state and local administrators to administer the AFDC pro-
gram in conformity with basic federal policies, expressed in general
terms, often leads to the promulgation of very specific rules in an at-
tempt to secure compliance.31 Moreover, because the regulations must
29 42 U.S.C. §§ 630-44 (1970).
30 The freeze was imposed by the Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 208, 81
Stat. 894. It was partially lifted by the act of Jan. 28, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-364, § 301,
82 Stat. 273; and was repealed by the Act of July 11, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-41, § 3, 83
Stat. 45.
31 See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) where the Court found that Alabama
(in a manner typical of many states) systematically excluded otherwise eligible children
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be designed to foster general federal policies (such as due process and
equal protection), general program policies (such as the policy that
aid be available to all eligible persons), and specific program goals,
certain regulations (such as the ones carrying out the amendments to
section 402 (a) (7) requiring a recipientes income and resources to be
considered in determining need) may be more detailed than would be
necessary solely to ensure the pursuit of any individual program goal.3 2
On the other hand, compliance problems may sometimes arise be-
cause of too few regulations rather than too many. There is evidence,
for example, that a considerable degree of state nonconformity was
engendered by HEW's reluctance to come forward with specific regu-
lations concerning what would be an acceptable amendment to state
plans under section 402 (a) (23). 3  And bowing to considerations of
"federal balance" and state prerogatives, 4 HEW does not always issue
detailed rules, even when noncompliance with general regulations is
discovered.
Urban Renewal
The most important federal standards in the urban renewal program
are requirements which condition grantee operations prior to the com-
mencement of project execution; once land acquisition or demolition
begins, the costs involved in making any changes to secure compliance
with federal standards increase enormously. The planning and appli-
cation process is thus the key element of the program for federal
grant purposes.
Nature of the Application Process-A conventional urban renewal
project involves the rehabilitation or clearance and development of a
blighted, deteriorated, or slum area. The project is planned and exe-
on the basis of highly conjectural income from the paramour of their mother. The
Alabama practice conflicted with basic policies of the AFDC program concerning the
definition of dependency and the provision of aid to all eligible individuals. Hence,
the Department was forced to draft very specific rules on income attribution to guide
state practice. Similar developments can be traced in a number of other areas including
fair hearings, income disregards, confidentiality, standards of promptness in eligibility
determinations, and a plethora of additional practice issues surrounding the provision of
aid to all eligible individuals.
32 Cf. Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
33 See Rabin, Implementation of the Cost-of-Living Adjustment for AFDC Recipients,
118 U. PA. L. REv. 1143 (1970). HEW has also taken considerable time to promulgate
regulations on fair hearings after Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
34 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 205.120 (statewide operation provision of § 402 (a) furthered
by only a broad and vague regulation).
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cuted by a local public agency (LPA),which contracts with HUD for
federal financial assistance in the form of advances, loans, and grants.
The LPA selected by a city to run an urban renewal project must file
with HUD a survey and planning application for the project. If the
application is approved, HUD reserves a grant for the project out of
the undistributed moneys in the Urban Renewal Fund and advances
federal funds to the LPA for planning purposes. The initial planning
stage lasts on the average about fourteen months, 5 and it culminates in
a loan and grant application. This application normally consists of
two parts,36 the first of which is submitted prior to approval by the
locality's governing body to allow the LPA to gain HUD's acceptance
of the urban renewal plan before entering the political fray for the
city's approval. The great majority of the information and supporting
data on the project accompanies part I. Part II merely updates this in-
formation and includes the locality's approval of the plan. Although the
application forms themselves are quite brief, the LPA also must sub-
mit a number of accompanying reports. The most important of these
reports establish through relevant factual data that the project meets
federal requirements. Once HUD approves the part II application, it
enters with the city into a loan and grant contract for the project.
While the six to nine years that typically are necessary for execution
mean that changes in the plan will probably be needed, HUD approval
is required in only a few cases. The LPA will be required, however,
to verify its compliance with federal standards during the execution
stage . 8
Congress recently established a new method of planning and funding
urban renewal projects designed to provide greater flexibility."' Un-
der the Neighborhood Development Program (NDP), a community's
renewal activity covers one or more urban renewal areas and is funded
35 BuRF-Au OF T BuDGET, SIMPLUIFNG FE.RAL Am To STATES AND CO mmuNms
9-10 (March, 1970). This stage has been shortened considerably by major reductions
in the required documentation of the planning process announced by HUD in February
1970. DEPARTMENT or HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPmENT, URBAN RENEWAL HAMBOO,
RHA 7200.1, (February, 1970) [hereinafter cited as URBAN RENEwAL HANDBOOK].
36 The two stage process is now optional and the LPA may combine Parts I and II
into a single application. URBAN RENEwAL HANDBoox, RHA 7206.1, ch. 2 (February,
1971).
37For example, where there is a change in project boundaries, and therefore a need
for more money, the LPA must file an amendatory loan and grant application.
38 HUD has recently simplified this process in several areas by allowing certificates
proclaiming compliance to be submitted in lieu of factual data. URBAN RmWAL
HANDBooOK, RHA 7200.1 (February, 1971).
3942 US.C. § 1469-1469(c) (1969).
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by HUD on an annual basis rather than through the reservation of a
single project grant. The LPA must specify annually the urban renewal
activities which it intends to implement during that year. By not com-
mitting funds years in advance and by requiring continued planning,
NDP seeks to lessen the danger that a plan will become obsolete before
it can be fully implemented.40
Federal Standards in Urban Renecwal-Many of the standards that
accompany urban renewal grants are budgetary and program controls
designed to ensure that the LPA operates efficiently. The more impor-
tant standards for purposes of this Article, however, are those intended
to protect the interests of third parties or to further national housing
goals. The following are examples of three such standards which raise
serious enforcement problems. While there are other standards govern-
ing issues which raise equally difficult problems, 41 these three will best
convey an idea of the problems which the recommendations of this
Article are designed to ameliorate.
a. Workable Program Requirements. In order to be eligible for
advances, loans, or grants for urban renewal, a locality must have a
certified "workable program for community improvement." HUD cer-
tifies programs for two-year periods. A workable program, which is
defined by HUD as a "[c]ommunity's own plan of action for elimi-
nating and preventing slums and blight," must demonstrate that a com-
munity is making satisfactory progress in four essential areas: housing
codes and housing code enforcement, overall community planning,
relocation of persons and businesses displaced by governmental action,
and meaningful citizen involvement in planning and executing HUD-
assisted programs.4 The adequacy of a community's workable pro-
gram may be challenged at the time it is filed with HUD for certifica-
tion or recertification or at the time the community files a survey and
planning or a loan and grant application. In addition to the above, there
is the further requirement that the planning section of the workable
4 OParticipation in NDP is voluntary, but a significant number of the large cities
have taken advantage of this alternate method of urban renewal.41E.g., eligibility of the project area, URBAN RENEwA. HANDBooK, RHA 7205.1
(February, 1971); eligibility of a project area for clearance and redevelopment, 42
U.S.C. S 1460(c) (1970). URBAN RENEWAL HANDB O K, RFIA 7207.1, ch. 1 (February,
1969), or for rehabilitation, URBAN RwEEwAL HANDBooK, RHA 7210.1, ch. 1, § 6 (Feb-
ruary, 1971); types of public hearings, 42 U.S.C. 5 1455(d) (1970), UmAN RENEwAL
HANDBOOK, RHA 7206.1, ch. 3 (February, 1971); and land acquisition policy, 42 US.C.
§4651 (1970).
42DPARTMNT OF HousING AiN URBAN DEvzPMENr, WoRKAB.E PROGRAM FOR
COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT H~mruooK, RHA 7100.0.
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program be of sufficient scope and content to permit evaluation of the
need for an urban renewal project. This final standard must be met at
the time of the part I loan and grant application for the project, and
HUD must determine that the project is in accord with the general
community plan in the workable program. 43
b. Minority Group Considerations. In addition to the requirements
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964," HUD requires that the
boundaries of a project area be determined without regard to race,
creed, color, or national origin of the residents.45 Even more important,
HUD requires the LPA to consider minority group interests in select-
ing and planning an urban renewal project. The project must con-
tribute to reduced concentration of minority group families and to
greater equal housing opportunity wherever feasible. It must not result
in a reduction in the supply of dwellings in the community available
to minority group families, and representative minority group leader-
ship must be consulted in planning the project. Whenever a project
will result in a substantial net reduction in the housing available to
minority group families in the project area, the locality must compen-
sate for the reduction by providing them with housing not previously
available to them elsewhere in the locality.46 The LPA must submit
with part I of its loan and grant application a report on minority group
considerations explaining how it has satisfied these criteria.
c. Relocation of Displaced Individuals and Families. The basic relo-
cation requirement is that individuals and families displaced from an
urban renewal area have available "decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings
equal in number to the number. .. of the individuals and families dis-
placed and reasonably accessible to their places of employment."47
The relocation housing must be in the urban renewal area or in other
areas not generally less desirable and at rents and prices within the
financial means of the displaced individuals and families. In addition,
the LPA must develop and submit a comprehensive program of relo-
cation assistance for displaced individuals, families, and businesses. A
relocation report must contain the LPA's relocation program and fairly
43 URBAN RENFWAL HANDBOOK, RHA 7204.1, ch. 1 (August, 1969).
44 See note 6 supra.
45 URBAN RENEWAL HANDBOOK, RHA 7207.1, ch. 1 (February, 1969).
46Id.
4742 US.C. § 1455(c) (1) (1970). The Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real
Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. S§ 4601 et seq. (1970) does not
repeal this section. The substantive standard on the availability of relocation housing
appears to be the same under both laws.
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specific data on the housing needs of displaced families and the housing
resources available to them. This information should demonstrate that
it is feasible to relocate displacees into standard housing that meets the
statutory requirements. 48
Additional relocation standards must be met at the execution stage of
an urban renewal project. The LPA must interview all site residents
to be displaced and supply them with an information statement on the
availability of relocation assistance and payments. 49 The LPA must also
keep records on the relocation of displaced individuals and families and
continue to provide them relocation assistance until they are relocated
in standard housing. In addition, the Secretary must require, prior to
actual displacement, satisfactory assurances by the LPA that decent, safe,
and sanitary housing is available for the relocation of each such indi-
vidual or family. Finally, Congress provided in the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 196950 that HUD must review by December 24,
1970 and every two years thereafter each locality's relocation plan and
the locality's effectiveness in carrying out that plan. This statute reflects
the increased concern in Congress over HUD's failure to enforce ade-
quately the basic standard in 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (1) that relocation
housing be available for persons displaced by urban renewal projects.
The Federal-Aid Highways Program
Statutory Standards-The federal government's participation in road
building has since 1921 been based on the view that the primary na-
tional interest involved is the provision of a linked system of toll-free
roads for the movement of persons and goods in interstate commerce. 1
Hence, aid is available only to the extent that a project is recognized
as a part of a federal-aid highway system,52 and the major funding effort
has been made with respect to the primary system which carries largely
inter-urban transportation.13  In addition, the states are required to
establish a state department of highways with sufficient authority to
carry out the duties imposed by federal legislation.54
Beginning in 1958 with the requirement that projects by-passing or
4842 U.S.C. § 1455(c)(1) (1970); URBAN RENEWAl. HANDBOOK, RHA 7212.1, ch. 2
(February, 1971).
49 URBAN RENEWAL HANDBOOK, RHA 7212.1, ch. 3, S 1 (February, 1971).
50 42 U.S.C. S 1455 (c) (3) (1970).
6123 U.S.C. S 301 (1970).
52 23 U.S.C. SS 103-05 (1970).
5823 U.S.C. 55 101(b), 103(a)-(d) (1970); 23 U.S.C. § 103(e) (1) (1970) (Supp. 1972).
54 23 U.S.C. §302 (1970).
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going through towns be approved for federal aid only on certification
that opportunity for public hearing has been afforded to interested
parties,e5 a series of interrelated standards concerning comprehensive
transportation planning, local control, citizen participation, environ-
mental quality, relocation housing, and social values have been grafted
onto the federal-aid highways program. The standards respond to
the increasing realization that federally aided highway programs have
produced a series of changes ranging from massive reorientations in
urban land use to degradation of atmospheric conditions, erosion of the
local tax base, increased shortages of low-income housing, and shifts in
state and local political power.
Many of these standards are analogous to those found in urban re-
newal. While local governing bodies do not have veto power over
highway plans as they do over plans for urban renewal, their views
must be considered,", and there must be cooperative planning between
states and localities.57 Projects must be consistent with area planning
objectives,58 and projects within Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas
must be based on continuing, comprehensive transportation planning.59
As with urban renewal, public hearings are required at times when
the state highway department retains flexibility to respond to the views
presented.6° Finally, the relocation processes in the two areas are both
governed by the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Land Acquisition
Policies Act."'
Some of the more important recent standards involve social, eco-
nomic, and environmental considerations. A state highway department
must certify that it has considered in its location decision for a federal-
aid project "the economic and social effects of such a location [and]
its impact on the environment." 2 This certification must be accom-
panied by a report indicating the consideration given to the various
effects and alternatives. 8 In addition, federal-aid highway projects
8523 U.S.C. § 128 (1970).
5623 U.S.C. § 143 (1970) (applies only to Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas).
57 23 U.S.C. S 106 (1970).
58 23 U.S.C. § 128 (1970).
59 23 U.S.C. §§ 134, 307 (1970).
1023 U.S.C. § 128 (1970); FEDERAL HiGHwAY ADMmsTRATION, Poucy AND Paocsnuan
MEMoRANDuM 20-8, 23 C.F.R. § 1-38 App. A (1972).
6142 U.S.C. § 4601 et seq. (1970). There are some differences in the two procedures
due to the fact that 23 U.S.C. § 133 (1970) makes certain additional relocation require-
ments. Moreover, the regulations issued by the two agencies are not the same.
62 23 U.S.C. § 128 (1970).
68 23 U.S.C. § 135 (1970).
Federal Standards in Grant-In-Aid Programs
must comply with the requirements in the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 inter alia of environmental statements and consulta-
tion with all federal agencies having authority or expertise with respect
to the environmental impact involved." Whenever a highway project
contemplates taking property from any park, recreation area, or wild-
life refuge of national, state, or local significance (as determined by
the responsible jurisdiction) or from a historic site similarly identified,
it may do so only if there is no "feasible and prudent alternative," and
then it must utilize "all possible planning" to minimize harm." Federal
legislation also promotes landscaping and scenic enhancement by pro-
viding that three per cent of a state's apportionment must be spent for
this purpose.
Comparison of Standards Under the Three Programs
It is apparent that, despite certain similarities, there are fundamental
differences in the standards found in the three programs. With some
obvious exceptions, the AFDC requirements tend to be substantive, that
is, to require that a state plan reflect certain essential elements which
make up an AFDC program (need standards, social services, work in-
centive programs and so on), whereas the federal-aid highway standards
are largely procedural; they require that state highway departments
coordinate with certain other agencies, consider certain questions, or
have certain processes for citizen participation. Urban renewal stand-
ards tend toward the procedural in this sense, though there are impor-
tant standards, such as those which establish whether an area is to be
accorded rehabilitation or clearance and redevelopment treatment, T
which reflect essential substantive policies.
Does one or the other type of standard have a better chance of being
followed consistently by the grantees and therefore producing fewer
compliance problems? The answer is clearly "yes." Procedural stand-
ards are almost certainly easier to enforce by the simple strategem of
requiring the submission of particular forms and certifications showing
that all the required consultations have been had, hearings held, and
,considerations considered. Moreover, because the procedure has to be
6442 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970) (Supp. 1972); Exec. Order No. 11514, 35 Fed. Reg. 4247
<1970).
65 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970).
6623 US.C. § 319(b) (1970).
6 See note 41 supra.
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repeated for each new project, the required routine is likely to become
fairly easily established in the state or local agency.
Should one then conclude that procedural standards are appropriate
for all grant-in-aid programs, including programs like AFDC? We
think not. The standards in the various grant programs are necessarily
different because they deal with different issues, personnel, and bene-
ficiaries. For example, the environmental effects of a particular high-
way location or the relocation problems of a particular urban renewal
project are not ones that can be dealt with in the same specific manner
as can the amount of earned income that is to be disregarded in figuring
the needs of a welfare recipient. Moreover, while the provision of a
required process for considering environmental or relocation impacts
which involves all the interested parties in the decision may be suffi-
cient to serve the national interest, federal policy is not likely to be
furthered by a provision that welfare recipients individually or as a
group negotiate with the state concerning the amount of earnings dis-
regard that will provide them an incentive to work. In AFDC the abil-
ity to provide concrete guidance combines generally with a felt necessity
for doing so, while the highway and urban renewal standards reflect
a process orientation which may not be sufficient but is often necessary.
The form of the standard must be tailored to the needs of the particular
policy and the ability of the policy-maker to develop sensible a priori
criteria. A single style of condition will not suffice for all programs
or, indeed, for all aspects of a single program.
The Need for Better Enforcement of Federal Standards
The program standards summarized above reflect a considerable
responsiveness in Congress and the agencies that administer federal
grant programs to findings that federally funded programs are pro-
ducing inappropriate results. To a certain degree, for example in AFDC,
this responsiveness has taken the form of increased protections or ex-
panded programs for existing classes of beneficiaries. In other instances,
notably the highways and urban renewal programs, solutions to emerg-
ing problems have required the recognition of new interests and hence
new classes of beneficiaries.
There are growing indications, however, that the grantees and bene-
ficiaries of many grant programs are without recourse in the face of
autocratic decisions or indifference by federal administrators, who are
unaccountable to a popular constituency and may be insensitive or
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unsympathetic to local problems and conditions.0 8 The position of the
putative beneficiary of a grant program or protective condition is of
particular concern. His interests depend upon the enforcement of fed-
eral standards and may be ignored in the accommodation of grantor
and grantee interests through informal processes in which the bene-
ficiary does not participate. Moreover, the effectuation of federal pol-
icy depends in large part upon whether these beneficiaries are secure
in the enjoyment of their claims to benefits, services, or procedural
protections.
The Agevcy Enforcement Effort
It is common knowledge that federal grantor agencies have had less
than total success in enforcing important federal standards in a num-
ber of major grant-in-aid programs, and there is considerable evidence
that the federal enforcement effort, with respect to some standards,
has been seriously deficient. The United States Commission on Civil
Rights recently conducted an exhaustive study of the federal govern-
ment's enforcement of the Title VI standard of nondiscrimination in
federally assisted programs. The Commission found that the enforce-
ment effort lacked uniformity and consistency and demonstrated a
reluctance to apply available sanctions in cases of noncompliance.69
The General Accounting Office has documented on several occasions
HUD's failure to obtain compliance with the federal standard that
adequate relocation housing be available for persons displaced by an
urban renewal project.70 No doubt the standards of nondiscrimination
and of adequate relocation housing are among the most difficult to
enforce, but the failures in these areas are discouraging; these standards
reflect vital national concern and vital beneficiary interests. In other
areas, federal agencies have not sufficiently articulated, much less en-
forced, federal standards that are crucial to grant-in-aid programs.
71
There are a number of reasons for the failure to enforce federal
grant-in-aid requirements. At the most general level, the reason is that
agencies are with few exceptions not "enforcement oriented." Grant-
68 Cahn & Cahn, The New Sovereign Immunity, 81 HARv. L. REv. 929 (1968).
69 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS EFFoRTS 803-09
(1970).
70 Tondro, Urban Renewal Relocation: Problems in Enforcement of Conditions on
Federal Grants to Local Agencies, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 183, 194-95 nn. 79-86 (1968). See
also E. CAHm, 1. EICHmNBERG, & R. RomBERG, THE LEGAL LAWBREAKERS: A SrUDy OF THE
NoNADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL RELOCATION REQUIREMENTS (1970).
71 See, e.g., W. BELL, Am To DF rENT CmDRaE 186-94 (1965).
19721
Virginia Law Review[
in-aid programs are, after all, meant to be cooperative efforts. The
posture of the federal agency toward its grantees is not generally that
of a referee calling fouls, but that of a coach giving support in the
form of cash and expertise. Moreover, there are strong incentives for
low-visibility conflict and accommodation. The mainstay of the fed-
eral enforcement arsenal, the fund cut-off, may have adverse effects.
The remedy, if it has to be applied, helps no one and torpedoes the
program. And while grantees may comply when threatened in a cred-
ible fashion with fund cut-off,72 the sanction raises the political stakes
in any federal grantor/state or local grantee confrontation enormously.
Federal grant personnel are hesitant to play, or play often, in high-ante
games. Furthermore, sharp delineation of federal versus state positions
and stringent efforts to exact compliance are likely to cause control of
the conflict to shift from the hands of agency professionals to the hands
of politicians.73 If this happens, the results will be unpredictable and
from the program professional's viewpoint may be disastrous.
These general attitudes have a pervasive effect on the internal en-
forcement mechanisms within grantor agencies. A review of the tech-
niques by which conformity issues are discovered, processed, and re-
solved in the AFDC program is instructive. Section 604 of the Social
Security Act provides a formal hearing procedure for determination
that a state is not in compliance with the requirements of section 402 (a)
and pertinent regulations. This procedure is initiated by the Secretary
and concerns conformity issues specified by him, but affected private
parties may participate as interveners. 4 The Regional Offices of HEW
employ a number of formal and informal review techniques, including
the receipt of complaints from private parties, to detect conformity
issues for ultimate resolution or prosecution through the formal con-
72 See, "e.g., Arizona State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. HEW, 449 F.2d 456 (9th Cir.
1971); Connecticut State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. HEAr, 448 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1971).
The fund cut-off or the threat thereof has also proved effective in achieving desegrega-
tion in many southern school districts receiving federal funds under Title I of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. 20 U.S.C. § 241j (1970). See
Carter, Equal Educational Opportunity for Negroes-Abstraction or Reality, 1968
U. ILL. L. F. 160, 174-76.
73 A classic example of this type of confrontation occurred in 1963 when HEW
refused to provide federal funds, under what is now the AFDC program, for Michi-
gan's plan to provide assistance to needy children with an unemployed parent because
Michigan's definition of "unemployment" conflicted with federal law. This struggle
quickly deVeloped into a personal -feud between Governor Romney and Assistant Sec-
retary Cohen of HEW. G. STEImNE, SOCIAL INSEcuRrry: Tim PoLITIcs oF WELFARE
101-07 (1966). Similar problems have recently arisen in California.
74 National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F2d 725 (D.C.'CIr. 1970).
[Vol. 58:600
Federal Standards in Grant-In-Aid Programs
formity-hearing procedure. Because everyone connected with the ad-
ministration of the AFDC program admits that there are still wide-
spread compliance problems, the procedures are obviously not wholly
adequate to ensure compliance. They do not work for a number of
general and specific reasons.
Regional Office Attitudes, Structure, and General
Compliance Procedures
Compliance and enforcement have not proved successful in the
AFDC program because HEW has not given them priority. Until
1968 regional offices had no delegated authority to negotiate with
states concerning compliance issues. They could merely identify such
issues and refer them to the central office. According to the longtime
director of the regional office studied for purposes of this article,
Region III, fifty-seven compliance issues were settled in one month
when that regional office was delegated authority to enter into negoti-
ations and settlements. At least half of those issues had existed for more
than two years. The long history of nonemphasis on compliance and
enforcement, however, has left an attitude within the relevant bureau
of the regional office, the Assistance Payments Staff of the Social and
Rehabilitation Service (SRS), that the principal responsibility for com-
pliance and enforcement lies with the state agency. The basic approach
of the regional office is preventative; the regional office sees its main
function as giving information to the states concerning requirements
and target dates, providing technical assistance on the drafting of
language, and giving other assistance and advice concerning state pro-
grams which is designed to obviate the identification of conformity
issues. Everyone in Assistance Payments talked to for the purposes of
this Article believes that the chief function of the employees of that
administration should be program development and not program evalu-
ation or enforcement.
The Steps in the Enforcement Process
A number of people in the Region III office of HEW have some re-
sponsibility for ensuring compliance with federal standards. The Execu-
tive Assistant to the Regional Commissioner is designated as the com-
pliance officer, but, in fact, he inherits the conformity issue only after
it has been identified by the personnel on the Assistance Payments
Staff. If he agrees with Assistance Payments that there is a conformity
1972]
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problem, he then refers the matter to the Regional Commissioner who.
sets up a docket. From this point the Regional Commissioner and his
staff have, at least hypothetically, six months to negotiate with the
state in order to settle the issue. If at the end of that period no satis-
factory progress has been made toward compliance, the issue is referred
to the central office.
The key personnel in the compliance efforts of the regional office are
really those on the Assistance Payments Staff. In Region III there are
now two employees in Assistance Payments (or "Income Mainte-
nance" as it has recently been renamed). They make all the initial
decisions concerning the conformity of state plan materials with fed-
eral requirements and concerning whether there is in fact compliance
in "practice" with the federal standards. They also make an initial
attempt to correct problems as they arise. Information concerning
the conformity or noncohformity of state public assistance systems
with federal requirements comes to the Staff through the submission of
state plan material by the states, administrative reviews of state systems,
informal contacts with the states, citizens' complaints, required statis-
tical reporting from the states, quality control reports, and federal
audits.
State Plan; Review-The state plan consists either of all the statutory
and regulatory materials which govern the operation of the state pub-
lic assistance system or a descriptive summary of these materials.
7
Every amendment to this material is forwarded to HEW for an
opinion as to whether it complies with federal requirements. At the
regional office level the SRS can accept state plan materials but can-
not reject them as nonconforming. Changes in a state's program, and
hence in its state plan, are not prevented from going into effect by a
determination of nonconformity by HEW. HEW's only remedy is
to withdraw federal matching funds after a conformity hearing sched-
uled by the central office. If the SRS personnel consider a state plan
amendment to be nonconforming, they will refer it to the central
office through the procedure outlined above.7
Because of the lack of personnel and the large number of submis-
sions, a large amount of potentially nonconforming state plan material
can slip by without objection. A recent report on compliance issues
75 There is now also a limited use of the proclaimer system for new or revised
requirements for state plans.
76 In many cases the states submit draft material to SRS for an opinion on whether,
if adopted, the material would be conforming.
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outstanding with respect to state plans lists sixty-nine assistance payments
issues which have been reported to the central office. 77 But persons
active in national welfare rights organizations or in legal services offices
in virtually any state can provide a list of numerous provisions in almost
any state plan about which serious questions of compliance could be
raised but have not been. Indeed, most of the issues of noncompliance
with federal standards that have been raised in litigation have never
been formally identified as compliance issues by HEW.78
To the extent that the regional office identifies state plan issues on
the basis of submittals by the state-and it would seem that this is the
usual manner in which they are discovered-the new proclaimer system,
whereby the states will merely check off the existence of various pro-
visions in their state plans on a standardized form, will make it in-
creasingly difficult for the regional office to make compliance deter-
minations. But in the final analysis, this may not be too important. A
look through the listed issues of nonconformity in the latest SRS
compliance report reveals a catalogue of relatively trivial issues con-
cerning the organization of community services units, formation of
advisory groups, and so forth. The core issues of eligibility that sur-
face continually in litigation are not being discovered and reported
through the review of state plans anyway.
Administrative Review-The major technique which should give
the regional office information concerning nonconformity in practice
is administrative review. The Program Staff Manual Part 5, Adminis-
trative Review of State and Local Operations, lists the objectives of
administrative review as providing a factual basis for assuring state ad-
herence to federal requirements, providing information on state admin-
istration to serve as a factual basis for reappraising present policies at
the federal level, and providing a factual basis for regional office advice
and assistance to the state agency on the development of its total pro-
gram. According to the Manual, reviews are to be made periodically
of the application process, fair hearings, foster care, intermediate care
facilities, money payments, and the simplified method of determining
77 DEPARTMENT OF HEALT, EDUCATiON AND WELirAR, SUMMARY OF COMpLuNC&
ISsUES BY STATES BY PROGRAM (report for quarter ending Dec. 31, 1971). These sixty-
nine issues do not, of course, include all of the issues uncovered by the regional offices.
Some are not yet reported as compliance issues because the preliminary investigations
are still in progress.
78 Of course, it is impossible to determine the extent to which this failure to raise
issues results from failure to see them as distinguished from an initial resolution of the
potential issues in favor of the conformity of the state plan when submitted.
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eligibility. A review is to be made in each of these areas approximately
every four years, subject to modification due to the availability of
regional staff and resources, varying circumstances, individual states,
and so forth.
In Region III administrative review has virtually been modified out
of existence. Since 1961 there has apparently been one review of
state quality control systems, one review of social services, and a con-
gressionally requested review of simplified eligibility methods. At
one time, approximately between the years of 1948 and 1950, the
administrative review technique seems to have been widely used. In
1950, however, the system was abandoned as too costly.
Currently, Region III has no specific timetable for carrying out
reviews. Instead, it uses a review when a particular problem, usually
one that has reached crisis proportions, is brought to its attention.79
Two reasons for thus limiting the use of administrative review are
advanced, the lack of staff and the use of the quality control system.
Neither of these reasons seems adequate. During most of the 1960's, the
Social and Rehabilitation Service staff in the Region III office was quite
large, but very few reviews were done. Moreover, the quality control
system is an extremely poor substitute for administrative review. Qual-
ity control focuses only on the eligibility aspects of the program, and
it provides few clues to local practices, because the sample in any
locality is small and unidentified.
Informal Contact-The Director of the Assistance Payments Staff
visits each state in her region for two or three days every six weeks.
On these visits she holds informal discussions and formal meetings with
state agency personnel concerning potential compliance problems sug-
gested by other information received. As an approach for discovering
compliance issues, the visitation method is probably best suited to state
administered programs. In those programs the state office generally
has good knowledge of what is going on in the local offices. In states
where local offices are semi-autonomous, the regional office personnel
can learn no more than the state agency itself knows, which may be
very little. The state visits are, however, probably a useful tool, because
they at least remind the states that HEW has not forgotten about them
and about the requirement that they conform to federal standards.
Citizen Complaints-The regional offices of HEW employ a highly
79For example,* a review of welfare applications was recently performed in three
Virginia counties because- a series of complaints had been received from cities alleging
maladministration-by local welfare officers.
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informal but reasonably consistent complaints procedure. Whenever a
complaint is received, the complaining party receives a response with-
in seven days. If the complaint concerns a local practice, the regional
office will usually refer the complaint to the state agency on the theory
that the states are primarily responsible for correcting local practices.
Where the question is one of eligibility, the regional office will suggest
to the complainant that he continue to deal with the local office and
also inform him of his right to a state appeal or fair hearing. The re-
gional office's response will also suggest that the person write back
if satisfaction from the state is not achieved. But if the issue involves a
state practice or policy, the regional office will take the appropriate
action itself. Also, in some cases involving local practices where the
state does not seem to be making any progress in solving the problem,
the regional office will send a representative to visit the complainant
and the local welfare department. A report setting out the facts found
in this investigation and the conclusions based upon it is then sent to
the state agency for appropriate action.
The citizen's complaint seems to have two values. First, it results
in prompt redress for a complainant who has made a good case. Sec-
ondly, it is a good source of information for the regional office on local
compliance issues. Unfortunately, the regional office seldom effectively
utilizes this information for general enforcement purposes. Because of
staff limitations, the regional office feels that not every complaint
should actuate an administrative review or investigation. Hence, only a
large volume of complaints or an extremely well documented com-
plaint suggesting a pattern of maladministration will result in an ad-
ministrative review. The regional office never reports to the Wash-
ington office any issue about which it merely has complaints and has
not itself conducted an investigation.
Furthermore, the present complaints procedure seems to have its own
Catch 22. Both the Assistant Payments Director and the Regional
Commissioner have stated that the reason they are able to handle com-
plaints so efficiently is that they only get a few. If the complaints
procedure were to become generally known and utilized, it would
collapse in a short time because the regional office has neither the staff
nor the desire to act as a reviewing center for local agency practices.
The regional office thinks the state department should be doing this
on its own. There is at present no systematic method in any state




Audit-The audit process is not really designed to discover state
nonconformity, although it occasionally does so. The auditor, usually
from the Federal Audit Agency (a branch of HEW), seeks to deter-
mine whether there is an appropriate expenditure of federal funds under
the state program, whether the state maintains adequate records, and
whether the state is appropriating funds sufficient to cover its share of
the welfare expenditures.8 0 The auditor might make an exception on
a state's grant, for example, were he to find that people were receiving
AFDC benefits for dependents over 18 years of age and not in school,
but he could do nothing about the failure to pay benefits to those
eligible, except perhaps to report any such discoveries to the regional
office of HEW. In fact, according to recent directives from the Bu-
reau of the Budget, the major functions of the federal auditors and
of the Department of Management and Fiscal Systems in the regional
office seem to be to demonstrate to the states how they can maximize
the amount of federal grant funds that they are receiving.
Reports-The Department of Program Planning and Evaluation, de-
spite its name, does not have significant impact on identification of
problems of conformity and enforcement. The main function of this
department is to help the states submit the thirty or more different
statistical reports required by HEW concerning the AFDC system. The
reports cover such diverse matters as the number and classification of
recipients, fair hearings, methods of dealing with recipient frauds, and
statistics on expenditures for assistance to Cuban refugees and U.S.
citizens returning from foreign countries. This statistical data flows
into the regional office at the rate of some 3,000 reports a year. About
all the two staff people in the Department of Program Planning and
Evaluation can do with this paper is to compile and file it, and by and
large they can do only the latter. Although some of these reports
would give information suggesting where compliance problems might
arise in various state systems, the Department of PPE's interest in con-
formity is limited to helping the states get their reports in on time so
that their nonreporting will not itself become a conformity issue.
The primary use of this statistical data seems to be to persuade Con-
gress that public assistance funds have been spent legitimately and for
80 The Federal Audit Agency has offices in every state. According to the Virginia
office, an audit has not been performed on the state's welfare system in five years be-
cause of the recent emphasis on education programs. The Virginia office plans an
audit in the near future. In order to accomplish this, however, the office staff, which
has no familiarity with the public assistance system, will have to be substantially re-
trained.
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program development. The Department of Program Planning and
Evaluation makes no attempt to put the reports into a form which would
specifically aid the compliance and enforcement effort. These reports
are, however, passed on, at request, to the Assistance Payment Staff
whose director reviews them. She says that a number of clues con-
cerning what she should talk to the state about in her visits come out
of the reports.
a. Quality Control. Included in the battery of reports sent to the
regional office by each state is the quality control report, which reviews
the accuracy of a state's welfare determinations by investigation of a
randomly drawn sample of cases."' The quality control system is the
embodiment of the basic philosophy of the regional office that the
primary responsibility for program evaluation and development lies
with the states. HEW has used the requirement that each state conduct
periodic quality control reviews as a means for reducing the extent
to which the regional office has to directly review a state's welfare
practices. Quality control seems to have become, in fact if not in
policy, a substitute for full-scale administrative reviews, at least in the
critical areas of eligibility and correctness of payments.
In each sample of cases drawn, AFDC cases make up one lot and
the adult categories another. The tolerance levels have been set by
HEW at three percent for both positive and negative eligibility deter-
minations and at five percent for decisions concerning payments. When
a state's quality control report reveals a percentage of error greater
than the applicable tolerance level, HEW requires the state agency
S Quality control is defined as:
[A]n administrative program for determining the extent to which those receiving
public assistance are (1) eligible for assistance, and (2) receiving assistance pay-
ments in the amount to which they are properly entitled. It is used by the state
and federal governments to maintain a continuing and systematic control over
the incidence of ineligible recipients and incorrect payments in public assistance
caseloads.
As a method of state administration, the quality control system has the purpose
of holding the incidence of error below pre-established tolerance limits of errors.
It accomplishes this purpose by means of three processes: (1) continuous review
of statistically reliable statewide samples of cases; (2) quarterly assembly and
analysis of case findings to determine incidence of errors; and (3) when tolerance
limits are found to be exceeded, corrective action to bring the level of er-
roneous cases within the tolerance established.
H. Krueger, Memo. to Superintendents of Public Welfare, Oct. 1, 1970. This description
refers to the new quality control system that became operative in October of 1970. Prior
to the fall of 1970, the states conducted quality control studies once a year and sub-
mitted the results to HEW. The regional offices found the results of this procedure
to be totally unacceptable. The failure did not lie in the findings-of the states but rather
in the paucity of state corrective action.
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to indicate in its reports what corrective action it has taken or will
take to reduce the rate of errors to a level within the tolerance limit.
A review of quality control reports submitted by Virginia to Re-
gion III during the period April 1, 1968-March 31, 1969 indicates
that the procedure may not be very effective. In all the reports the
incidence of error was above the tolerance levels, and in each case the
corrective action listed was either so vague that it was meaningless or
should have been required of the state initially in order for it to have
a conforming state plan. These errors, of course, become subject to
negotiations and questions by the regional office staff in their con-
tinuing informal contacts with the state.
Although members of the regional office say that the quality control
system provides the best information they have about state operations,
the system is seriously deficient in several respects. Most important,
the quality control report gives the regional office no real idea about
where the problems are. The "intolerable" level of error could be in
one or two local welfare offices or it could be randomly spread through-
out the state. The report does not indicate whether the errors that
appear are part of a general pattern of noncompliance in certain locali-
ties or whether they are simply isolated mistakes. This distinction is
extremely important in those state systems which are still run through
the medium of semi-autonomous local offices. HEW can, of course,
require that states further analyze their quality control data to deter-
mine whether there are localized problems, but the sample in many
localities may be so small that it is statistically meaningless.
b. Central Office Involvement. The compliance manual states that
the regional office has ninety days to resolve any difficulty in the im-
plementation of new plan material before reporting the problem as a
compliance issue to the central office and proceeding into formal nego-
tiations.m After the ninety-day period has expired, the issue is re-
ported in the region's quarterly compliance report and formal negoti-
ations commence. During this phase, which may last at a maximum of
six months, both the regional and central office staff work with the
state in an attempt to resolve the issue. When the six-month time
period has elapsed, or a determination has been made that further nego-
tiations are of no avail, the Regional Commissioner is supposed to
recommend to the Administrator of the Social Rehabilitation Service
at the central office -that an offer for formal hearing be made to the state.
82 A similar three month period is used when dealing with noncompliance in program
operation.
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Once this recommendation has been made, there are no further
time restrictions, and, in fact, a great many recommendations simply
die in the central office or are referred back to the regional office for
further negotiations. It would appear that the central office makes a
determination concerning how it will pursue compliance in terms of the
type of issue that is involved and also on the basis of other factors,
such as the recalcitrance of the state, political pressures, how solid the
case is, or whether achieving compliance through a hearing in this case
is likely to have a significant impact in achieving compliance elsewhere
through less formal means.11
It is perhaps for these reasons that the Regional Director of the
Assistance Payments Administration in Region III says that the key to
achieving compliance is the persistence with which the regional office
holds to what it says at the beginning and lets the state know that it
is not going to drop the matter. Thus the regional office may stretch
out the ninety-day preliminary negotiating phase much longer than
ninety days in the hope that within a reasonable time an accommodation
can be reached with the state without creating the sort of adversary
and often frustrating situation that develops from reporting the state's
noncompliance to the central office. However defective this internal
administrative process, it resolves some 5,000 potential compliance ques-
tions per year in a fashion acceptable to both federal and state agencies.
In conclusion, there is a tendency for federal grantor agencies to
stress program development rather than enforcement, to develop a
close working liaison with grantees which is likely to be upset by any
high visibility conflict, and to deal more effectively with issues of com-
pliance which respond to negotiation than with issues which require
large expenditures of effort and political capital. This is an under-
standable stance, but one which should be counterbalanced by inputs
from the persons affected by any noncompliance with federal standards.
It is to the provision of a structural system of such inputs through
effective complaint mechanisms at both the grantor and grantee levels
of administration that this Article's recommendations are directed.
s8 Occasionally, the regional office feels seriously undercut by the failure of the
central office either to force a compliance hearing based upon the recommendation of
the regional office or to issue clarifying regulations which would allow the regional
office to deal intelligently with a state which is attempting to comply but does not
understand precisely what is required. It is embarrassing to the regional office to have
its decisions regarding the acceptability of state compliance reversed by the regula-
tions of the central office.
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Federal Standards Litigation
* The last two or three years have witnessed an unprecedented num-
ber of federal suits challenging grant-in-aid programs, on the basis
that the operations of such programs do not comply with federal
requirements. Litigation concerning compliance with federal grant
standards takes essentially two forms: (1) a suit seeking review
of a federal grantor agency's funding decision,4 or (2) a suit against
a grantee claiming that its failure to comply with federal standards has
deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities guaranteed
by federal law. Suits in the first category raise the normal problems
associated with judicial review of federal agency action-jurisdiction,
venue, reviewability, and so on-while suits in the second category are
normally based on the civil rights acts' provisions. 5
Litigation as an Indicator of the Compliance Problem
The level of litigation in the federal courts is a strong indicator that
serious compliance problems are being encountered in grant-in-aid
programs. In particular, recent litigation has highlighted four areas
in which the problem of enforcing federal standards is acute. The first
area is that of civil rights, particularly as stated in Title VI of the
84 This type of litigation has been facilitated by the broadened concepts of standing.
Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970);
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). It is now generally conceded that the intended
beneficiaries of a federal grant-in-aid program who are adversely affected by the
operation of the program at the federal, state, or local level have standing to sue the
offending officials. E.g., M. M. Cracken Co. v. Portsmouth Redev. & Housing Authority,
437 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1971) (person relocated under urban renewal program). This lib-
eralized concept of standing includes those whose claims are based on their rights as bene-
ficiaries, not of the program itself, but of its general protective obligations. See, e.g.,
Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970); Road
Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (citizens gained standing,
not solely by their use of highways, but also by their residential proximity to them);
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Inc. v. Connolly, 331 F. Supp. 940 (ED.
Mich. 1971) (plaintiff civil rights group entitled to standing to challenge a Small
Business Administration loan to another party on grounds, inter alia, that such funds
would be used to discriminate against minority owned businesses by the recipient and
that the grant would thus be made in violation of 42 U.S.C. S 2000(d) (1970)).
85 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). At least one case has indicated that a private civil action
based on federal grant standards might be implied without the aid of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970). Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969).
Gomez has bred a rash of suits which have been based upon the theory that federally
funded employment agencies are violating federal directives by referring migrant
workers to jobs providing substandard working conditions. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1971,
at 1, col. 4.
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Civil Rights Act of 1964.0 In the 1960's HEW cut off federal funds
from numerous school districts and hospitals in the South, but a recent
United States Court of Appeals decision may have undermined HEW's
efforts by requiring that HEW make a finding of discrimination in
each program of categorical assistance rather than rest its findings
solely on the fact that the recipient discriminated generally in its
operations.8 7 HUD has also been involved in Title VI enforcement
litigation, as shown by two recent decisions holding local housing
authorities in violation of Tide VI and the fourteenth amendment
because of discrimination in the selection of public housing sites.8 In
one recent case, HUD itself was found to have violated Title VI be-
cause of its approval of plans which a city had adopted with actual
intent to drive out blacks.8 9 Controversy over HUD's civil rights role
now centers on the question of the affirmative measures which the
Department must take under the Civil Rights Act of 1968 to ensure
that its grants do not contribute to segregated housing patterns 9
A second area where serious enforcement problems have arisen is
in federally assisted state welfare programs. Because of its extreme
reluctance to apply the cut-off sanction,9' HEW has failed to take effec-
tive action to resolve questions of compliance, even where recipients
have claimed clear state violations of federal statutory standards on the
eligibility of families for welfare. Welfare recipients have responded
with an avalanche of suits against state grantees, alleging deprivations
under color of state law of rights guaranteed by the United States
Constitution and Title IV of the Social Security Act.92
Urban renewal litigation has also highlighted the enforcement prob-
lem. Many communities and civic groups have found HUD's enforce-
8642 U.S.C. S 2000(d) (1970).
87 Taylor County Bd. of Educ. v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
88 Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
89 Garrett v. City of Hamtrack, 335 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
90 Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971).
91 ADVISORY COMmISSION ON INTERGovE.RNMENTAL RELATiONs, STATUTORY AND ADMrNis-
nRATVE CONTROLS ASSOCIATED WITH FFDERAL GRANTS FOR PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 62-64, 92
(1964).
92A number of these cases have reached the Supreme Court. E.g., Townsend v.
Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971) (invalidating Illinois' prohibition against receipt of AFDC
benefits by college students aged 18-20); Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970) (in-
validating California's income attribution rule); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397
(1970) (disapproving New York's redetermination of need); King v. Smith, 392
U.S. 309 (1968) (invalidating Alabama's "man in the house" rule).
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ment of public hearing9 s and relocation 4 requirements inadequate and
have brought suit in federal court to secure the observance of these
standards. 5 Further litigation is to be expected, particularly after the
imposition of important new statutory requirements on urban renewal
projects in 1968 and 1969.96
Persons affected by alleged noncompliance with federal standards
contained in the Federal-Aid Highways Acts9 7 have also repaired to
the courts to seek relief. While some of the cases involve special claims
to relocation assistance,98 they are largely suits claiming defects in the
planning process required for federally aided highway construction
and seeking to enjoin the funding of projects until these defects are
cured.99
9342 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (1970).
9442 US.C. S 1455(e) (1970).
95 See, e.g., Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968);
Garrett v. City of Hamtrack, 335 F. Supp. 16 (ED. Mich. 1971); Home Furniture Co.
v. HUD, 324 F. Supp. 1401 (WD.N.C. 1971); Shannon v. HUD, 305 F. Supp. 205 (E.D.
Pa. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970); Western Addition Com-
munity Organization v. Weaver, 294 F. Supp. 433 (ND. Calif. 1968).
96See 42 U.S.C. §5 1455(f), (h) (1970). Fixed percentages of housing units in project
areas redeveloped for predominantly residential uses must be for moderate and low
income persons. Low and moderate income units must be provided "at least equal in
number" to the number of such units that existed prior to demolition if the vacancy
rate in the locality is less than five per cent.
9723 U.S.C. § 101 etseq. (1970).
98E.g., Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie, 449 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1970);
Hanley v. Volpe, 322 F. Supp. 1306 (ED. Wis. 1969).
99 Because of the nature of the federal standards, the complaint usually takes the form
of allegations that the state highway department has not touched all the bases necessary
for grant approval, for example, the holding of public hearings. See D.C. Federation
v. Volpe, 434 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Lukowski v. Volpe, No. 20634 (D. Md. filed
April 7, 1969). Occasionally it may be possible to allege that the facts do not warrant
a finding made by the Secretary of the Department of Transportation or that the
Secretary has not made a finding specifically required of him. Examples can be found
in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 US. 402 (1971); Named Indi-
vidual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446
F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971); D. C. Federation v. Volpe, 434 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cit. 1970); Brooks
v. Volpe, 319 F. Supp. 90 (WD. Wash. 1970); Pennsylvania Environmental Council,
Inc. v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (MD. Pa. 1970). In particular, Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. has been a major factor in introducing an increased judicial involve-
ment in the grant process. In that case the Supreme Court found that the Secretary of
Transportation's highway funding decision was reviewable and directed the district
court to determine: whether he acted within the scope of his authority, whether his
decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, and whether applicable
procedural requirements were observed. 401 U.S. at 415-16.
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The Efficacy of Litigation as a Compliance Technique
Remedies-Although the remedies aspect of the law of federal grants
has been developing rapidly, it is still in its infancy. The question of
remedies has been particularly difficult in the welfare area, where a
cut-off of federal funds, the basic remedy of both courts and agencies,
tends to fall especially hard on the intended beneficiaries. In Rosado
v. Wyman, 1 0 for example, the Supreme Court declared New York's
method of determining need inconsistent with federal requirements,
but then remanded the case to the district court to fix a date which
would afford the state an opportunity to revise its program. If New
York did not do so by the determined date, the district court was to
enter an order restraining the further use of federal moneys.101 Justice
Douglas, in a concurring opinion, recognized the danger in such a
remedy: "That a State may choose to refuse to comply with the fed-
eral requirements at the cost of losing federal funds is, of course, a
risk that any welfare plaintiff takes." 02 Justice Douglas did not men-
tion that the plaintiff takes that risk not only for himself but for all
New York welfare recipients. The Court seems to have avoided such
risks in some cases by simply declaring the state statute or regulation
invalid.1 3 This is feasible, and perhaps sound, where the "invalid"
state regulation is not necessary for the program's administration and
can be held entirely void without any need for its being replaced. How-
ever, there would appear to be no bar to a state's continued application
of the offending provision were the state to decline further federal
funding. 14
Another major limitation on the judicial relief available, particularly
in urban renewal and highway programs, is that the plaintiffs may not
seek or obtain judicial review until after considerable costs have been
expended on the project.105 In Norwalk CORE v. Norvalk Redevel-
opment Agency, °a for example, the project had been completed by
the time the court recognized the plaintiff's standing to sue. Even when
100 397 US. 397 (1970).
101 Id. at 421-22.
102 Id. at 427.
103 E.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (the "man in the house" rule).
104 But see Judge Thornberry's "federalization" of the state highway department in
Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway
Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971).
105 Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (SD.N.Y. 1967).
106 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968); see McGee, Urban Renewal in the Crucible of
judicial Resiew, 56 VA. L. REv. 826, 866-67 (1970).
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the project is not completed, the sunk costs may deter courts from
granting sweeping relief. This timing problem has been mitigated by
regulations allowing challenges to administrative decisions before actual
construction begins07 and by judicial decisions allowing early review.108
As stated by former Justice Black,
[I]t is simply not realistic to consider the construction of [an] ex-
pressway "section by section" . ... Once construction is begun and
heavy investment made on the two end segments, the available options
for routing the middle segment are severely limited.10
Institutional Considerations-Even with the maturing of the remedies
aspect of the law of federal grants, judicial review is not likely to
provide effective enforcement of standards. Judicial review is charac-
teristically a slow and expensive process. In areas such as public assist-
ance, only the major test case can be mounted, because judicial relief
for individuals costs more than the benefits derived. The problem is
solved only partially by the thin ranks of free counsel.
The method of judicial review, particularly of a federal grantor
agency's determination, poses its own difficulties. For example, under
the Administrative Procedure Act courts must decide whether the Secre-
tary of Transportation, in making certain required findings before
funding highways, °10 has acted within his scope of authority and in a
manner not arbitrary, capricious, or constituting an abuse of his dis-
cretion."' According to Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe,"2 the former inquiry consists of a look into the nature of the
administrator's authority and discretion, including those standards and
criteria which govern his decisions, and a determination of whether,
1I0 See, e.g., workable program requirement under an urban renewal program, notes
42 & 43 supra and accompanying text.
108 See, e.g., Citizens' Comm. v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970); Hanley v. Volpe,
305 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. Wis. 1969); Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
109 Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas
Highway Dep't, 400 U.S. 968, 970-71 (1970) (dissenting from denial of certiorari). Black's
reasoning was subsequently adopted by the circuit court, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971).
110 E.g., 23 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1970) (the proposed facility must adequately meet the
existing and probable future traffic needs in a manner conducive to safety, durability, and
economy of maintenance); 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970) (parkland can only be used for
highway construction if the Secretary finds that there is no feasible and prudent al-
ternative).
1115 U.S.C. S 706(2) (1967) (Supp. 1972).
112401 U.S.462,7415-16 (1971).
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given the facts that he knew or should have known, his decision can
reasonably be said to be within that range. The latter inquiry con-
sists of a determination of whether the Secretary's decision was based
upon a consideration of all the relevant factors and whether the deci-
sion made was unreasonable or a clear error of judgment.
This review of grant decisions is costly to litigants and expensive in
terms of judicial resources. With a few exceptions,113 present highway
laws do not require formal findings of fact and law. A reviewing
court must make a complex examination of all the factual inputs into
the administrative process. Furthermore, since the "bare record may
not disclose the factors that were considered or the Secretary's con-
struction of the evidence," 114 actual testimony of the administrative
decision-makers may be required.1 5 This is burdensome to courts and
administrators alike and makes judicial review an awkward compliance
weapon. Such a detailed judicial examination of the administrative
process also means that the complainant is not likely to be successful
often. A court reviewing broad requirements on a standard of arbi-
trariness or capriciousness and relying on testimonial proof concerning
mental operations cannot be expected to upset administrative judgments
except in the most egregious situations.
Indeed, should the statutory standard be less stringent than the one
involved in Overton Park, judicial review may be largely perfunctory.
In Western Addition Community Organization v. Weaver,""' HUD
had never made the required determination that satisfactory arrange-
ments had been made for relocation of displacees. The court enjoined
the Secretary of HUD from honoring future requisitions from the
local agency for federal funds until such a plan had been approved.
The Secretary subsequently found the local agency's relocation plan
and assurances satisfactory to him, and the court dissolved the injunc-
tion. The court viewed its role on reviewing the Secretary's determi-
nation narrowly:
113 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1970) (Supp. 1972) (provision of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act requiring a detailed study of probable environmental effects before
approval of major federal projects); Department of Transportation Order No. 5610.1
(Oct. 7, 1970) requires the Secretary to make formal findings when he approves the
use of parklands for highway construction.
114 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
115 See, e.g., D.C. Federation v. Volpe, 316 F. Supp. 754 (D.D.C. 1970), reVd on other
grounds, 434 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied 92 Sup. Ct. 1290 (1972).
116 294 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
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[T]he judicial function is narrowly limited to ascertaining whether
the Secretary has made the determination required of him by law,
and, if so, whether he has acted in apparent good faith, reasonably
rather than arbitrarily and with some factual basis for his decision.
If so, judicial review can go no further11'
Moreover, in areas such as welfare litigation, the nature of the pro-
ceeding may require at least preliminary examination by a three judge
court and expedited appeal to the Supreme Court.1 8 Scarce judicial
resources are thus being consumed in some compliance litigation at three
times their normal rate. Since the pressure from welfare compliance
litigation is great, it is conceivable that the federal court pipeline for
determination of welfare issues will begin to be closed off on jurisdic-
tional grounds. Because $10,000 can seldom be seriously alleged as the
amount in controversy in a welfare claim (these are not the type of
class action claims that may be aggregated), the welfare claimant or
claimants must allege a colorable constitutional issue in order to give
a federal court jurisdiction." 9 These constitutional issues largely in-
volve equal protection, and since the Supreme Court's retrenchment
from an expanded review of state social welfare legislation in Dand-
ridge v. Williams, 20 it is conceivable that federal district courts will
increasingly decline jurisdiction on grounds of failure to allege a sub-
stantial federal question.
Nor is it likely that compliance litigation can effectively be shifted
to state courts. State judiciaries have been considerably less hospitable
than federal courts to suits against grantees based on federal grant
standards. Illustrative is the highway grants field, where the approach
of the state courts has been that federal standards are conditions on
funding and relevant only to a grant decision by FHWA.' 2' Occa-
sionally state statutes will direct that state officials comply with federal
highway standards,' 22 but even then the court may take the FHWA
117 Unreported decision of March 5, 1969, see ABA National Institute on Federal
Urban Grants, 22 AD. L. REv. 113, 268 (1970).
11828 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970). The reason is that the welfare claimant almost always
seeks to enjoin local or state agency implementation of state law on grounds of a
violation of the claimant's federal civil rights.
119 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) (1970).
120 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
121 See, e.g., Morningside-Lenox Park Ass'n v. State Highway Dep't, 224 Ga. 344,
161 S.E.2d 859 (1968); Futch v. Greer, 353 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1962);
Linnecke v. Department of Highways, 76 Nev. 26, 348 P.2d 235 (1960); Piekarsld v.
Smith, 38 Del. Ch. 402, 153 A.2d 587 (1959).
122E.g., N.Y. HiGHWAY LAw § 85 (Mc~inney 1962).
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approval of the project as conclusive evidence of the satisfaction of
these requirementslas
In conclusion, while recognizing the tremendous impact that litiga-
tion may sometimes have in furthering compliance with federal stand-
ards,124 the accelerating incidence of litigation concerning federal grant
programs is probably more symptomatic of disease than evidence of the
application of effective therapy. The proposals which follow are not
a panacea for the ills of the various grant-in-aid programs. They are,
however, designed to introduce a modicum of order and responsiveness
into the process of disposing of claims alleging a failure to comply
with standards attached to federal grants-in-aid.
RECOMMENDATION
A. The Federal Administrative Complaint Procedure5
The federal grantor agency should have an administrative procedure
for the receipt and impartial disposition of complaints by persons
affected by the grant-in-aid program that a plan, project application,
or other data submitted by a grant applicant or grantee as a basis
for federal funding does not meet one or more federal standards. This
procedure should afford the complainant an opportunity to submit
to the grantor agency for its consideration data and argument in
support of the complaint and should afford the grant applicant or
grantee involved a fair opportunity to respond to the complaint. If
the agency determines that the complaint is not valid, it should notify
the complainant of its determination and should state in writing the
reason for its decision. If the agency determines that the complaint
is valid, it should notify both the complainant and the grant applicant
or grantee of its determination and should state in writing the reason
for its decision. If the agency exercises discretion not to make a
determination on one or more issues raised by a complaint, it should
so notify the complainant in writing. The agency should dispose of
all complaints within a prescribed period of time.
The complaint procedure administered by the federal grantor agency
should also provide for the receipt and impartial disposition of com-
123 See Town of Clearmont v. State Highway Comm'n, 357 P.2d 470 (Wyo. 1960).
124 See, e.g., Barrett, The Role of the Courts in Welfare Reform, 1970 Dur L.J. 1;
NATIONAL CENTER FOR SOCIAL STATISTCS, TRENDS IN AFDC ixx 1965-1970 AN SEaacrED
ANNUAL PERIODs, Report H-4 (1970).
125 The Administrative Conference has slightly altered the language of Part A.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF TnE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATION 31: ENFORCE-
mNT OF STANDARDS IN FEDERAL GRANT-nT-Am PRomzAMs (Adopted, December, 1971).
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plaints that a grantee has in its administration of the funded program
failed to comply with one or more federal standards. It is anticipated
that many grantor agencies will find it necessary to limit their con-
sideration of such complaints to situations in which the complainant
raises issues which affect a substantial number of persons or which
are particularly important to the effectuation of federal policy and
will, therefore, dispose of most individual complaints concerning
grantee administration by referring the complainant to such com-
plaint procedures as are required to be established by the grantee.
The grantor agency should by regulation define the classes of cases
that it will consider sufficiently substantial to warrant processing
through the federal complaint procedure and those classes of cases
wherein complainants will be required to pursue a remedy through
available complaint procedures administered by the grantee.
The purpose of Part A is to strengthen the role of federal grantor
agencies in enforcing federal standards in grant-in-aid programs. It
proposes that federal agencies respond to the problems of enforce-
ment by developing administrative procedures for handling complaints
that a grantee has not complied with federal standards. The initiation
by federal agencies of formal complaint procedures, or the strengthen-
ing of existing procedures, should lead to a broader acceptance within
the federal agencies of their responsibility to enforce federal standards.
In practice, complaint procedures should also operate to provide fed-
eral agencies with more complete information on compliance problems
and to shift from the courts back to the federal agencies the primary
role in resolving questions of compliance with federal standards.
Federal agencies should, of course, seek to achieve increased compli-
ance with federal standards through any other means that prove effec-
tive. They may conduct educational programs to inform grantees of
their obligations and may provide technical advice and services to aid
grantees in complying with federal standards. These techniques recog-
nize that a grantee's noncompliance may be due to ignorance or to staff
limitations rather than to any conscious disregard of federal standards.
The federal grantor agency might also clarify its interpretation of
applicable federal standards and even develop models for grantee ad-
ministration that would assist grantees in conforming with federal
standards in their program operations. Other techniques for improving
compliance with federal standards include more intensive or frequent
administrative reviews of grantee operations and an audit system de-
signed to detect grantee expenditures that violate federal standards.
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Part A singles out the administrative complaint procedure, because
that technique recognizes that the ultimate beneficiaries of grant-in-aid
programs have a significant interest in the grantee's compliance with
federal standards. In recent years there have been widespread efforts
by individual citizens and public interest groups affected by grant pro-
grams to hold program officials accountable for their actions. These
efforts often result in law suits but may also take the form of concerned
citizens' meetings, petitions, and campaigns in the mass media. A fed-
eral administrative complaint procedure would involve these private
interests in the compliance and enforcement process of the federal
agency, which should in turn lead to an improved record in enforcing
federal standards. In addition, an effective complaint mechanism should
convince the beneficiaries of the grant-in-aid program that the grantor
agency is responsive to their interests and thus restore their confidence
in the grant program.
Encouragement to individuals and public interest groups to police
grant programs may cause some discomfort to administrators who find
the interference troublesome. Organizations of welfare recipients, con-
servationists, neighborhood residents, public housing tenants, and other
persons affected by grant programs may demand a lot, and their views
may conflict sharply with those of program officials of the federal
agency or of the grantee. These pressure groups, however, have in-
terests of the same legitimacy as more established and therefore more
familiar group claimants, such as professional and trade associations,
labor unions, veterans organizations, and the Chamber of Commerce.
Their tactics may sometimes be abrasive, but their presence is important
for informed decision-making concerning the allocation of federal
funds. Too often in the past they have been left out of the administra-
tive process.16
Scope of Application
Complaints Directed at Grantee Submissions-Part A covers com-
126 Reforms in the system of federal grants-in-aid, such as the consolidation of grant
programs and the institution of block grants, have benefited state and local grantees by
strengthening their role in the grant process without any corresponding recognition
of the role of the ultimate beneficiaries of the system. Other examples of reform in-
clude the areawide planning requirements of § 204 of the Demonstration Cities and
Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, 42 U.S.C. § 3354 (1970); the prior consultation
on new federal agency regulations and standards to which the heads of state and local
governments are entitled under Bureau of the Budget Circular A-85 (June 28, 1967);




plaints that a plan, project application or other data submitted as a
basis for federal funding does not meet federal standards. The words
"plan, project application or other data" are intended to cover at least
six types of submissions: (1) state plans which must be approved by the
federal agency to qualify for a formula grant, (2) state, regional, or
local plans which must be approved by the federal agency before a
project grant will be awarded, (3) amendments to both these types of
plans, (4) project applications for individual project grants, (5) amend-
ments to project applications, and (6) reports and factual data which
are submitted with a plan or project application or at a later stage to
demonstrate that a grantee has met specific federal standards. In all
cases the word "submission" should be liberally construed to cover the
operative provisions of a grantee's plan or application and should not
be restricted to documents that are physically transferred from the
grantee to the grantor. For instance, a state plan submitted to HEW to
qualify for a formula grant may summarize or only refer to the state's
operative statutes and regulations and need not contain their actual texts.
The statutes and regulations are nevertheless part of the state plan,
and a complainant should be able to challenge their conformity with
federal standards.
The majority of complaints processed under this aspect of the fed-
eral complaint procedure should be complaints directed at pending
plans, applications, or amendments thereto that have been submitted
to the federal agency but not yet acted upon or approved by it.
Ideally, as many complaints as possible should be resolved at this stage,
before the agency has made a funding decision by approving the sub-
mission. For example, potential displacees should be able to complain
that a relocation plan accompanying an application for an urban re-
newal grant does not comply with federal standards. 2 7 Such complaints
would raise issues that are basic to the effectuation of important federal
policies, and grantor agencies should, if possible, seek to resolve them
prior to plan approval.
The complaint mechanism with respect to grantee submissions is
intended to function in two additional situations. First, it covers com-
plaints that the federal agency has improperly approved plans or appli-
cations that do not in fact conform to federal standards or that plans
127 The administrative complaint procedure would also allow complaints by welfare
recipients who claim that a new state statute or regulation on eligibility for assistance or
income disregard violates federal standards, or by conservation groups who claim that
a state highway project does not conform to federal environmental or planning re-
quirements.
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or applications submitted and approved in the past are no longer valid
because they have not been brought into conformity with newly im-
posed federal standards. Both aspects of this problem have recently
4risen in the area of social assistance grants to the states where HEW
is now questioning the conformity to federal standards of state plan
material submitted and approved years ago. Although the states in-
volved have continued to receive federal funds on a regular basis, they
have either never submitted adequate plan material to HEW or have
not conformed their plan material to new federal requirements. In
these situations federal agencies should entertain complaints that plan
material or applications no longer conform to federal standards. Of
course, a federal agency need not continually redetermine issues of
compliance and may dispose of subsequent complaints by informing
the complainant that a particular issue has already been resolved by
the agency.
Secondly, the complaint procedure in Part A encompasses situations
where the federal agency must make a finding that federal requirements
have been satisfied before it releases federal funds to the grantee or
before it approves the initiation or continuation of a federally assisted
program or project. Thus, where a state highway plan calls for the
taking of parkland, the federal agency should entertain complaints
under section 138 of the Federal-Aid Highways Act 28 that a feasible
and prudent alternative route does exist or that all possible planning has
not been done. This function of the complaint mechanism overlaps
with the primary function of resolving complaints at the application
stage. Often the grantee will be required to include in its application
the factual data it believes will support a determination that federal
standards have been satisfied. The federal agency, however, may feel
compelled to determine, not only at the application stage but also at
a later time when the project is fully planned or even partially exe-
cuted, whether the data supports a finding of compliance with federal
standards. Complete data often is not available at the application stage,
and Congress has sometimes required that the federal agency make the
requisite finding in mid-project. For example, in urban renewal proj-
ect grants HUD must be satisfied at a reasonable time prior to the
actual displacement of individuals and families that adequate relocation
housing is available for them.'O Where the agency makes the crucial
determination resulting in the continued flow of federal funds at a
128 23 U.S.C. S 138 (1970).
129 42 US.C. § 1455(c) (2) (1970).
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point in time later than the application stage, complainants should be
able to take advantage of the proposed complaint procedure at that
time.
Complaints Directed at Grantee Operations-The second paragraph
of Part A covers complaints that a grantee has failed to comply with one
or more federal standards in the administration of a federally aided
program. Since compliance in practice is the compliance that really
counts, the federal agency should not limit its complaint procedure to
issues of paper compliance. Rather, it should also assume responsibility
for handling complaints that a grantee is not complying in practice
with federal standards, including those standards provided in Part B
concerning a grantee's complaint procedures.
The provision concerning operational complaints is narrow, covering
only those complaints that raise issues which affect a substantial number
of persons or which are particularly important to the effectuation of
federal policy. Compliance issues which affect a substantial number of
persons include a state or local welfare agency's failure to process
promptly applications for assistance,n ° the failure of a hospital aided
under the Hill-Burton Act to accept charity cases, and a public housing
authority's insertion of improper provisions into its tenants' leases. Even
when the challenged action of the grantee affects only one person, the
federal policy at stake may sometimes be important enough to channel
complaints through federal complaint procedures. This is particularly
likely to occur where there is some danger that grantees will be hostile
or indifferent to the federal policy. The most important example is
the federal policy of nondiscrimination. All of the regulations imple-
menting Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-1 require federal
agencies to process directly individual complaints of discrimination in
federally assisted programs, and such complaints would clearly fall
within the proposed procedure. The federal agency should by regu-
lation define those classes of cases in which it would make available
the grantor complaint procedure to process individual complaints con-
cerning grantee practices.
The second paragraph of part A recognizes that individual grievances
may in many cases be better handled through the grantee's complaint
procedure recommended in Part B, below. The grantee's complaint
mechanisms are likely to be more conveniently located and accessible
to the complainant, and the grantee is likely to have more ready access to
180 42 U.S.C. § 402 (a) (10) (1970).
13142 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-05 (a) (1970).
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the facts. Fair complaint procedures at the grantee level should satis-
factorily resolve the great majority of individual complaints. Further-
more, to require the federal agency to handle individual complaints
would impose a significant burden on the agency, a burden which
should be imposed only for good reasons. 3 2
Agencies may, of course, disagree about when individual complaints
should be heard at the federal level. HUD has determined under the
Uniform Relocation Assistance and Land Acquisitions Policies Act of
197013 that a claimant dissatisfied with a grantee's determination of his
eligibility for relocation benefits or the amount thereof may appeal to
the federal agent,3 4 while DOT does not process complaints concern-
ing individual relocation benefits.13 5 Careful study is needed to deter-
mine which approach is better in the context of particular programs,
but as a general matter it does not appear desirable for the federal
agency to handle individual complaints. These complainants should
pursue their remedies under the grantee's complaint procedures and,
if not satisfied with the result, should then be able to take their indi-
vidual grievances to court without further delay. An additional pro-
cessing of their complaints through a federal administrative complaint
procedure would be duplicative and wasteful from the point of view
both of the federal agency and of the complainant where no pattern
or practice of non-compliance is involved.
Structure of the Federal Complaint Procedure
Part A permits federal agencies to retain great flexibility in struc-
turing the proposed administrative complaint procedure. Implemen-
tation requires, however, that an agency make public a procedure to
receive and impartially dispose of complaints that a grantee's submis-
sions or operations violate federal standards.
The federal agency should delegate the responsibility for handling
complaints to designated officials in the regional or area offices of the
agency. These officials should have the responsibility for investigating
complaints to determine their validity and for disposing of all com-
132 For example, HEW should not be required to handle the complaint of an indi-
vidual welfare recipient who is upset about the termination or reduction of his benefits.
13342 U.S.C. S§ 4601 etseq. (1970).
134 24 C.F.R. § 42.190 (1971).
13549 C.F.R. § 25.21 (1971). On the other hand, HUD's procedure does not con-
template an appeal to the grantor on ,the question of whether an individual has been
relocated into substandard housing, a question of considerable importance to the bene-
ficiary of relocation assistance.
Virginia Law Review-o
plaints in an appropriate fashion. Their identities should be publicized
and prospective complainants directed to them. The decisions of these
officials may, if the agency chooses, be subject to further administrative
review at a higher level within the agency.
Unlike other hearing procedures, independent hearing officers are
not desirable for the federal complaints process. In most cases it will
be desirable to closely integrate the enforcement process and program
administration. An important function of a complaint mechanism, one
which even a minor complaint can perform, is to supply the federal
agency with information and notice as to compliance questions. Pro-
gram officials who handle complaints are able to utilize the information
which they acquire in this role in deciding whether to conduct ad-
ministrative reviews and in making informal efforts to educate grantee
personnel about federal requirements and to persuade them to comply.
A well informed program official may in this fashion bring about a
high degree of compliance with federal standards without imposing
any formal sanctions. Furthermore, the formal handling of complaints
by program officials. should focus their attention on compliance ques-
tions and make them more enforcement oriented. Also, it would be
difficult to attract high calibre personnel for a purely enforcement
section of an agency, since the political flack that would almost cer-
tainly be encountered and the segregation from the mainstream of
the agency might inhibit their career advancement. Finally, it may well
be that wholly "independent" administrative decisions on conformity
questions are not possible where there is a question of conflict between
state and federal governments. Advancement of long term federal and
beneficiary interests is more likely to be achieved in many instances
through coordinated enforcement and program administration, sub-
tlety, and political acumen than through "judicialization" of the com-
plaints process.
Part A leaves the nature of the hearing afforded to the complainant
largely to the determination of the federal agency. The recommenda-
tion does provide, however, as a minimum requirement for a fair hear-
ing, that the complaint procedure afford the complainant an opportunity
to submit data and argument in support of the complaint. Written
submissions will be an appropriate basis for decision in most cases. In
some instances, however, as where the complainant is not represented
by an attorney and cannot be expected to ascertain independently the
precise legal basis for his complaint, the complainant should also be
able to present his complaint orally to an agency official. Where appro-
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priate, the official designated to handle complaints should seek to
resolve them through informal negotiation and conferences between the
complainant and representatives of the grantee. While due process
does not require that the federal agency afford complaining bene-
ficiaries a trial-type hearing, 3 " there are some cases where formality
may be desirable. The agency should therefore have available a formal
procedure for a full hearing on a complaint at which the complainant
and others similarly situated, as well as representatives of the grantee,
may present testimony and oral argument. For example, complaints
directed at grantee practices affecting a substantial number of persons,
such as the relocation of displacees or eviction of tenants, may raise
substantial contested issues of fact. Ventilating these factual issues at
a public hearing may serve a number of useful purposes. First, it should
help the federal agency determine what the real facts are. Second, the
publicity that accompanies the disposition of the complaint may serve
as an effective sanction for achieving compliance with federal standards
by the grantee. If a public hearing discloses widespread violations of
federal standards, a grantee is under considerable pressure to rectify
the situation.'37 Third, a public hearing should convince the complain-
ants that the federal agency is responsive to their needs and may even
convince them that the grantee's noncompliance is not as widespread as
they originally thought. Finally, if an agency holds a full hearing, a
reviewing court should more readily defer to any findings of fact
made by the agency.
Agency Discretion not to Resolve Complaints
Part A permits a federal agency to exercise discretion not to deter-
mine one or more issues raised by a complaint. It is important that the
agency in such cases notify the complainant within a prescribed period
of time of its decision not to act. This should allow the complainant
to pursue any judicial remedies available free of the encumbrance of
186E.g., Kendler v. Wirtz, 388 F.2d 381 (3rd Cir. 1968) (railway workers affected
by a mass transit grant); Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1970) (tenants of
a "below market interest rate" project affected by a rent increase); Powelton Civic
Home Owners Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (residents challenging
the area's urban renewal eligibility). While the nature of the factual and legal issues
in dispute determines the type of hearing which is required, courts are reluctant to
impose "trial-type" procedures where informal procedures serve as well. See First
National Bank v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267, 273-76 (4th Cir. 1965) (Sobeloff, J, dissenting).
If a formal hearing is required, federal agencies should follow that procedure.
18 See p. 680 infra.
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doctrines such as exhaustion of administrative remedies and primary
jurisdiction.
For two major reasons it seems desirable that federal agencies retain
some discretion as to when they formally raise compliance issues in the
public forum. First, the federal agency is not merely a neutral arbiter
in compliance proceedings but has other independent enforcement
responsibilities. It should, therefore, not be forced by the mere filing
of a complaint either to rely on the possibly inadequate submissions of
the parties or to allocate agency resources to the development of facts
and policy in an area that it does not consider as significant to the
accomplishment of federal objectives as other compliance issues to
which the same resources might be devoted. Since most agencies
could not thoroughly investigate every alleged compliance issue with-
out outrageous expense, some capacity for assignment of priorities is
essential. Discretion not to decide a complaint is one means of pro-
viding such capacity.1 38
Second, the agency should be in a position to decide whether com-
pliance can be better ensured in a particular situation by low visibility
conflict or negotiation rather than by surfacing issues in a public hear-
ing. Particularly where state or local governments are involved, the
cooperative approach may often achieve a higher degree of overall
compliance with federal standards than the public confrontation that
follows a finding of nonconformity. For example, stringent enforce-
ment of federal standards by HEW would rapidly become politically
unacceptable because of that program's particular characteristics. First,
it is not a popular program. Second, the states do not admit that Con-
gress has any particular wisdom in dealing with public assistance re-
cipients or in structuring public assistance programs. Third, there is
a large investment of state money and occasionally a substantial invest-
ment of local funds in the program. Fourth, the conflicts between
state operation and federal standards which may surface as a result
of the proposed complaint process will require changes in state plans
that, at least in some instances, can only be made by state legislatures.
Fifth, the funds for an increased enforcement effort, including provi-
sion of hearing personnel, must come from Congress. These five factors
taken together are almost certain to produce a highly charged political
P8 This proposal is in accord with the present law which recognizes the standing of
affected persons to intervene in a conformity hearing once the agency has raised an
issue of noncompliance. On thp other hand, it does not recognize their standing to
trigger a coiformitry proceeding by raising 72ew compliance issues. National Welfare
Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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atmosphere around hearings held on complaints concerning a state
system. HEW may find it desirable to seek solution to many of its
conformity problems by means other than the conflict mechanism.
While it might be argued that the level of political conflict will diminish
as the complaints process becomes part of the welfare scene, most
observers of the politics of welfare do not believe it.139
An agency's decision not to resolve issues raised in a complaint does
not mean the agency should bury those issues. The complaint proced-
ure has supplied the agency with information on a potential problem,
and the agency should use that information in its informal contacts with
the grantee. In those informal contacts, the federal agency should com-
municate any doubts about the grantee's compliance and discuss possible
modifications or adjustments in the grantee's plan or application that
would resolve the doubts while still permitting the grantee to proceed
with its program.
There are arguments against recognizing federal agency discretion
not to resolve complaints. Recognition of this discretion may reduce
the role of the federal agency in resolving compliance questions and
limit the participation of affected persons in the agency's compliance
and enforcement process; it is thus in some sense inconsistent with the
main thrust of the recommendation. The federal grant-in-aid system,
however, has many ambiguities. It depends for its ultimate success on
the effectiveness of the federal agency in achieving compliance with
federal policy through the use of all the techniques at its disposal. A
complaint procedure should improve the effectiveness of the grant sys-
tem, but at the same time it should avoid abstract judgments concerning
the use of particular compliance techniques which might interfere with
the federal agency's primary responsibility for developing and imple-
menting an effective enforcement program.
Present Agency Practices
The implementation of Part A will require some affirmative action
by all federal grantor agencies covered by the recommendation. The
recommendation contemplates a publicized complaint procedure which,
139 See, e.g., G. STEImER, SocIAL INsEcURITY: THE PoLmnCs OF WELFARE (1967). One
observer of the development of the AFDC program concludes that the congressional
intent must be for the federal grant policies to influence state actions but not control
them. This is the only way to reconcile the fact that federal standards are precisely
and explicitly provided and yet ineffectually enforced. M. DEmcRTIc, TE INFLuENcE OF
FEDERAL GRANTs: PuBLIc AsssrANCE IN MASSACHUSETTS (1970).
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as part of the federal agency's enforcement machinery, provides a forum
for resolving issues of compliance. Existing complaint procedures do
not meet these criteria. While agencies do respond to complaints and
often make substantial efforts to investigate the matters and to help the
complainants, the process is too often haphazard. Prospective complain-
ants do not know to whom in the agency they should direct their com-
plaints or who has responsibility for resolving them. And when individ-
ual complaints are fully processed to the satisfaction of the complainant,
the amount of agency time expended in the effort may be greatly dis-
proportionate to the benefit secured. For example, research at the
HUD regional offices in Philadelphia and New York revealed that an
inordinate amount of time was spent handling the relatively small num-
ber of individual complaints that came to the attention of the field staff.
The arrival of more complainants would have swamped the process.
More serious complaints challenging whole projects were never really
resolved but instead were shunted to the courts.
HUD-HUD receives a considerable number of complaints that
workable programs filed by local governmental units for certification by
HUD and applications for loan and grant contracts for urban renewal
projects do not conform to federal standards, particularly with respect
to the provision of low-income housing and the relocation of displaced
persons. Often these complaints are drafted by lawyers and resemble a
plaintiff's complaint in a law suit. They are entitled administrative
complaints, and lengthy allegations of fact are often supported by
documentary material. The impetus for preparing these administrative
complaints evidently'came from the decision in Powelton Civic Home
Owners Association v. HUD.14° Porwelton held that the residents of an
urban renewal area had a due process right to submit to HUD for con-
sideration documentary evidence and written argument challenging the
eligibility of an urban renewal project in Philadelphia for federal fund-
ing. One senses, however, that the lawyers' purpose in filing adminis-
trative complaints with HUD is not so much to convince HUD of the
merits of their clients' case as to avoid the defense in a subsequent
judicial action that their clients did not exhaust their administrative
remedies. The Department of Justice raises this defense routinely, even
though there are presently no formal remedies available to exhaust.
HUD's reaction to these complaints is positive. It reads and considers
any relevant written material received and responds in writing to all
complaints. Normally the regional offices handle this task, but the
140 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
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Washington office may become involved if the complaint is troublesome
or was directed to the Washington office initially. Often the General
Counsel's staff responds to complaints; program officials handle com-
plaints even though they are closely involved in planning and adminis-
tering the grants which generated the complaints. 41
HUD's present procedures lack the designation of specific officials to
receive complaints and to resolve, in a reasoned fashion, issues of com-
pliance. The adoption by HUD of a more formal structure to handle
complaints would have at least four beneficial results: (1) it would
force HUD to clarify its own thinking on compliance questions; (2)
in cases where HUD found noncompliance, it would pressure state and
local governments to revise their plans and applications to conform to
federal standards; (3) in cases where HUD found compliance, it would
often forestall litigation, either because the complainant was satisfied
with the explanation or was convinced that it was futile to pursue the
matter further; and (4) if the complainant nevertheless took the matter
to court, the court would have the benefit of HUD's views and expertise
on the compliance issue and might accord them considerable weight.4 2
FHWA-Citizen complaints under the federal-aid highway program
are generally processed through conferences among the division engi-
neer (or his staff), the complainant, and state highway department
personnel. There is no formal process for making a complaint except
at public hearings. 43
The FHWA at one time proposed to structure the complaints process
but was met with strong resistance by state highway officials. The
proposal provided for an appeal to the FHWA from the Division Engi-
neer's approval of state highway department location and design de-
cisions after the required public hearings. Within certain time limits
any "interested person" was to be allowed to appeal, which would
stay the release of funds for the project until a determination was made
on the complaint. State officials thought this process would take away
141 On one occasion a well documented complaint led to a HUD field investigation
that resulted in the rejection of the application of the Westside Urban Renewal
Project in Pulaski, Tenn., Berger and Cogen, Responsive Urban Renewal: The Neigh-
borhood Shapes the Plan, I URBAN L. ANNUAL 75, 106-17 (1968).
142 State and local governments applying for grants should not be prejudiced by a
complaint procedure. They have always been given ready access to agency officials.
The recommendation does not affect any right that they may have to a hearing or
review of the decision to deny or withhold federal funds.
143 The Division Engineer in Virginia, however, reports that his office deals with three
or four complaints per week which may arrive from the office of the Secretary of DOT,
from a local congressman, or even from the office of the President.
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state prerogatives, allow any troublemaker to delay a project at least
temporarily and destroy the assurance to the state highway departments
that federal funds would be available at the various stages of the project
when required. Taking account of these comments, the FHWA with-
drew the proposal for further study.'" The proposal has not reappeared.
Experience with Complaints under Title V1
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Agency regulations implementing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 provide that a person who believes that a recipient of federal
financial assistance has discriminated against him on the basis of race,
color, or national origin has a right to file a written complaint with the
federal agency administering the federal assistance.1 45 These regulations
also generally provide for the designation of a "responsible department
or agency official" to receive complaints of discrimination. 46 They
further require that recipients of federal financial assistance take reason-
able measures to inform the ultimate beneficiaries of their right to com-
plain about discriminatory treatment. 4 7 If a complaint is not valid, the
responsible agency official designated to receive the complaint must so
inform the complainant in writing. 48 If a complaint is valid, assistance
may be terminated only pursuant to an express finding of discrimination
after an evidentiary hearing with the bases for decision limited to facts
of record.'4 9
Complaints under Title VI are more likely to involve discriminatory
practices in the operation of a program than faulty plans, applications,
or other submissions on file with the federal agency. Normally these
documents will contain routine assurances of nondiscrimination, and
the complaints will allege that grantees are violating these assurances
in executing their grants. The United States Commission on Civil
Rights50 has concluded that the existing mechanism for handling Title
VI complaints is confusing and inadequate. The officials responsible for
handling complaints do not have sufficient status within their respective
144 34 Fed. Reg. 727 (1969).
145 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 80.7(b) (1971) (HEW); 24 C.F.R. § 1.7(b) (1971) (HUD);
43 C.F.R. § 17.6(b) (1971) (Dep't of the Interior).
146 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 80.13 (c) (1971) (HEW).
'47 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 80.6(d) (1971) (HEW).
148 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 80.7(d) (2) (1971) (HEW).
149 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)-I (1970).
'150 UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTs, FEmLx CIVIL RiGn-s ENFoRcEmENT
EF-oRT (1970).
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agencies; their salary level is likely to be lower than that of program
administrators; and their staffs are often disproportionately small for
the task involved. Furthermore, compliance proceedings are frequently
protracted, and sanctions are only rarely imposed."51
Part A contains no specific reference to complaints of discrimination
by grantees of federal financial assistance. Federal agencies may retain
under this recommendation separate procedures for handling Tide VI
complaints while establishing or formalizing new procedures for handl-
ing other complaints. Civil rights enforcement is a delicate task that
may justify a separate enforcement mechanism staffed by civil rights
specialists. In addition, Title VI affords grantees special hearing rights
prior to the imposition of sanctions. However, this recommendation
should prompt all federal agencies to examine the effectiveness of their
existing procedures for handling Title VI complaints. Where those pro-
cedures do not conform to the minimum requirements proposed in Part
A, appropriate action should be taken to improve the procedures.
The Federal Complaint Procedure and Judicial Review
Judicial review is becoming increasingly available to persons adversely
affected by a federal agency's decision to grant, deny, or terminate
federal financial assistance, 152 although there are still areas where an
agency's decision on grant matters is committed by law to agency dis-
cretion.153 Where the agency holds a formal hearing, the traditional
scope of judicial review has been for the court to resolve all questions
of law and to determine whether there is substantial evidence on the
record as a whole to support the agency's findings of fact. The majority
of grant decisions, however, are not subject to the requirements for
hearings on the record in sections 7 and 8 of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act,es and the scope of review is consequently more limited.
The reviewing court should determine only whether the agency stayed
within its statutory authority, observed all procedural regularities, and
acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously on the basis of the record
before the court.155
An important advantage of an administrative complaint procedure
is the opportunity which it offers a federal agency to reassert its pri-
151 Id, at 702-24.
152 See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
153 E.g, Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1969) (termination of Veterans
Administration grant).
154 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (1970).
'55 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 US. 402 (1971).
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mary responsibility for resolving compliance issues. While the broad
trend in favor of judicial review is too widespread to eliminate the
courts altogether-and, indeed, there is no reason to think that such a
result would be desirable-the complaint procedure should make judicial
review necessary in fewer cases and more orderly in those cases where
it is necessary. If the agency integrates its complaint procedure into
its program administration by considering complaints when making
funding decisions, the courts should normally insist that litigants exhaust
their administrative remedies and take advantage of the complaint pro-
cedure before bringing suit. In many cases the complaint procedure
should eliminate the need for court action by satisfactorily resolving the
complaint, and in those cases where it does not, the court should have at
least the benefit of the agency's views.
It should be emphasized, however, that there is a definite need to
safeguard complainants' judicial remedies against grantees, particularly
because of the federal agency's discretion not to hear complaints. Once
formal complaint procedures are established, there is good reason to be-
lieve that the courts will require exhaustion of administrative remedies
or will find that the grantor agencies have primary jurisdiction to de-
termine questions of compliance with federal standards. In litigation
involving claims of nonconformity of state welfare systems with
federal law, for example, claims usually are made in a class action
suit in federal court alleging a violation of the plaintiffs' federal civil
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although the Supreme Court has held
that such plaintiffs are not required to exhaust state administrative or
judicial remedies,"" it has not spoken to the question of federal adminis-
trative remedies. Later cases in an analogous area, how~ever, have held
that exhaustion' of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
conciliation procedure 5 7 is necessary before suit can be brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1981 for discrimination in employment. 8 Such holdings
suggest' exhaustion requirements in the federal grants area as well.
Similarly, language in at least one recent Supreme Court opinion sug-
gests that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction might well apply were
the federal agency to have d formal complaints process. 59 In the con-
-
56 Damlco v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967) (per curium).
157 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(a) (1970).
M 'Watefs ,; .'Wis'onsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970). Contra Young
: v. I.T.T., 438 F.2d 757 (3rd Cir. 1971).
159In Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970), the majority answered the dissent's
charge that primary jurisdiction should apply by saying' "[plaintiffs] do not seek review
of an administrative order [there was none],'nor ,could they have, obtained an ad-
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text of welfare litigation, it is arguable that once a procedure is estab-
lished that may be actuated by private parties and in which they may
participate, primary jurisdiction lies with HEW to determine the con-
formity or nonconformity of state plans or the administration of state
plans with federal standards. Certainly the question involved is one
within the traditional field of agency concern. While such a view might
be countered by showing that the issues before the court and the agency
differed or that the agency process had no immediate prospects of termi-
nation, a strong possibility for the use of the doctrine of primary juris-
diction would remain.
These prospects for the development of judicial review suggest poten-
tially serious difficulties in harmonizing a discretionary administrative
complaint procedure with judicial review of state agency action. Con-
ceivably a court could defer to federal agency action while the agency,
with no requirement to decide complaints, took no action. Part A seeks
to mitigate these difficulties by providing for time limits within which
a disposition of some kind must be made on every complaint. Where
reasonable time limits for disposition exist, a court which feels compelled
to defer to agency expertise could do so without too serious adverse
affect on the complainant's interests in speedy resolution of the dispute.
In a more positive vein, a major advantage of the complaint procedure
is that the existence of an administrative record is likely to encourage
the substitution of review on that record for an evidentiary hearing in
the court. This is particularly likely when the federal agency has con-
ducted a full hearing on the issues raised by a complaint. Where a
court must review the validity of an administrative determination in
the absence of any administrative findings or record, the court has little
choice in most cases but to take testimony and to determine the facts
for itself. If the administrator has not disclosed the factors he considered
or his construction of the evidence, "it may be necessary for the
District Court [the reviewing court] to require some explanation in
order to determine if the Secretary [the administrator] acted within
the scope of his authority and if the Secretary's action was justifiable
under the applicable standard." "10 To that effect, the reviewing court
ministrative ruling since HEW has no procedure whereby welfare recipients may
trigger and participate in the Department's review of state welfare programs." Id.,
at 406. The negative implication is that if HEW did have an administrative procedure
which could be triggered by recipients and in which they could participate, then the
court might have a different view toward the appropriateness of litigation in federal
district court.
160 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
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may require "the administrative officials who participated in the de-
cision to give testimony explaining their action," even though such testi-
mony involves an inquiry into the mental processes of the administrative
decision-makers.""'
Extensive hearings and testimony of this type can often be avoided
if a federal agency provides the reviewing court with a contemporaneous
administrative record resolving complaints about the project and de-
fending any decision to proceed. If the reviewing court is furnished
with an adequate explanation of the agency's decision, it should not
hold an evidentiary hearing but should review the record to ensure that
the agency stayed within its statutory authority, observed all procedural
regularities, and acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously.162 Judicial
review thus limited in scope should, on the whole, work to the ad-
vantage of the agency. The prospect of judicial review should also
encourage the official designated by the federal agency to resolve com-
plaints to state in writing the reasons for his decision and any de-
terminations of fact which he has made. Absent a showing of bad
faith or improper behavior, there can be no inquiry into the mental
processes of the administrative decision-maker if he makes formal de-
terminations of fact. 63
The Implementation of Part A: A Case Study of Urban Renewal
The implementation in the urban renewal program of the adminis-
trative complaint procedure proposed in Part A is both feasible and
desirable. While there is no doubt that the implementation of this pro-
cedure will require additional effort on the part of HUD, the added
burden must be balanced against the overall benefits accruing to urban
renewal from the procedure. These benefits are basically the same as
those discussed in the general commentary to Part A, that is, the more
effective enforcement of federal standards, the strengthening of the
role of the federal agency, the reduction of interference from the courts,
and the improved handling of citizens' grievances. In addition, the com-
plaint procedure should improve the decisional process employed by
HUD for allocating scarce urban renewal funds.
161 Id. An extreme example of such an inquiry occurred recently in D.C. Federation
v. Volpe, 316 F. Supp. 754 (D.D.C. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 434 F.2d 436 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), where Secretary of Transportation Volpe personally testified for five honirs-
concerning his release of federal funds for bridge construction involving the use of-
parldands.
162 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-17 (197.);
163 Id., at 420.
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The most appropriate time for persons affected by an urban renewal
project to file complaints directed at the project is when HUD is
reviewing the part I loan and grant application. The local public agency
(LPA) normally must submit factual data to show its compliance with
federal standards, and it is at this point that complainants should be
able to challenge the LPA's data on the grounds that it is inaccurate or
insufficient. For instance, a complaint may challenge an LPA's descrip-
tion of the housing resources in the community available to displacees
or an LPA's finding that the condition and debt-carrying capacity of
dwellings in the project area make their rehabilitation feasible. Po-
tential displacees or owners of the dwellings to be rehabilitated may
be able to show that the housing market in the community is much
tighter than portrayed by the LPA or that the owners of the dwellings
are not likely to obtain the financing needed to make rehabilitation
feasible."" Complaints directed at survey and planning applications
present more difficulties, because the application may be too sketchy to
permit an effective challenge and may be eliminated altogether if the
LPA elects to use local funds for its planning process. Nevertheless, it
is desirable to process complaints at this early stage. A survey and
planning application must establish the eligibility of the project area and
must demonstrate that the project meets one of the national goals (or is
exempt therefrom).165 Affected persons opposed to a project proposed
in a survey and planning application may complain that the project area
is not eligible for urban renewal treatment because it is neither a slum
nor a deteriorated area or that the project does not meet any of the
national goals. These complaints should be resolved promptly so that
projects which fall short of these basic federal standards are never
begun.
All complaints of noncompliance with federal standards should be
resolved before a loan and grant application is approved and the project
funded through a loan and grant contract. If the complaints are not
resolved at this stage, they will probably arise again in the midst of
project execution, when the opponents of the project seek to stop the-
1404 Similarly, persons affected by.renewal activity should be able to file complaints-
when an LPA submits a Neighbgrhood Development Program application for an annual
increment for an action year or an amendatory loan and grant contract to expand a:
conventional urban r~neval project.
165 HUD normally gives priority treatment to projects that meet specific criteria for
the conservation and exoansion of low and moderate income housing or for the de-




project through a lawsuit. If complainants do not avail themselves of
the administrative complaint procedure at the application stage, 'doc-
trines of exhaustion or waiver should preclude them from later chal-
lenging the project in court, unless there was good reason for their
failure to present their complaints at the application stage.
A major benefit which should accrue to the urban renewal program
from the introduction of an administrative complaint procedure is an
improved allocation of urban renewal funds. HUD must allocate limited
resources among competing applications in a way that will best further
national housing goals. These goals are reflected in the federal stand-
ards that accompany urbah renewal project grants. Broadly speaking,
the purpose of these standards is to ensure that an urban renewal project
contributes to the supply of decent housing and to a decent environ-
ment and does so in a way that does not disproportionately injure the
residents of the project area. The enforcement of these standards is
often difficult, because cities embarking on urban renewal projects may
have different interests, such as the beautification of the central business
district, the increase of the tax rolls, or the economic well-being of
local real estate and redevelopment industry. These interests may con-
flict with the federal standards and with the interests of project area
residents.
The availability of an administrative complaint procedure should
assist HUD in the allocation process by providing more complete in-
formation. The complaint procedure should involve in the grant process
affected third parties, acting in many cases as private attorneys general.
These private attorneys general may provide HUD with new perspec-
tives on the facts and with an independent source of information, thus
preventing too intimate and friendly a relationship from developing
between HUD and LPAs applying for federal funds. Based on the
added information, HUD should be able to reject applications that do
not meet federal standards when it might otherwise have approved the
applications because the noncompliance with federal standards went
undetected. For example, the Comptroller General has documented the
collapse- of a major urban renewal rehabilitation project in Cleveland
which never should have been approved, because rehabilitation by the
property owners was not economically feasible."' An administrative
complaint procedure should help the agency avoid similar mistakes in
the future.
166 CoMmoLLER GENER's REorT- To Ti CONGzESS, MoRE Ficnvz FEDERAL AcrnoN
NEEDED To M= URBANm RENEwAL REHABImTATO OBJECTIES w CLEvE1AMN, Omo (1968).
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B. The Grantee's Administrative Complaint ProceduresleT
The federal grantor agency should require as a grant condition the
establishment by the grantee of procedures to handle complaints con-
cerning the grantee's operation of the federally assisted program.
These procedures should afford any person affected by an action of
the grantee in the operation of the program a fair opportunity to
contest that action. The "fair opportunity" to contest will necessarily
vary with the nature of the issues involved and the identity and in-
terests of the complainant. In all cases, however, the complainant
should have the right to submit to the grantee for its consideration
data and argument in support of the complainant's position. Where
it is claimed that the action which is the basis for the complaint de-
prives the complainant of any individual benefit or protection to
which he is entitled under the grant-in-aid program, the grantee
should afford the complainant an adjudicatory hearing on all contested
issues of fact.
Part B proposes that the federal grantor agency require as a grant
condition the establishment by the grantee of administrative procedures
to handle complaints concerning the grantee's operation of a federally
assisted program. Such a-complaint procedure should assist in achieving
compliance with federal standards by providing a formal, publicized
mechanism whereby affected persons may inform the grantee of poten-
tial violations of federal standards and may obtain a hearing on their
complaints. The grantee, having learned of a violation, should in the
great majority of cases correct the situation voluntarily. Where the
grantee refuses to acknowledge a violation of federal standards, the com-
plaint procedure should nevertheless alert both the grantor and the
grantee of a potential compliance problem. The federal agency should
be able to obtain an overview of the compliance situation by monitoring
a grantee's complaint procedures or by requiring periodic reports by the
grantee. In addition, an effective complaint procedure should improve
the quality of a grantee's program and should make the program more
responsive to the concerns of the ultimate beneficiaries.
The complainants who take advantage of the grantee's complaint
procedures are likely to be individuals with specific grievances. Parts
A and B both recognize the need for procedures for handling this type
of complaint where the grievance arises, rather than at some remote
167 The Administrative Conference deleted the last sentence of Part B as superfluous.
ADmmINsTRATIVE CONFERENCE or Th ONrrED STATES, RECOMMENDATION 31: ENFORCEMENT
oF STANDARDS IN FEDERAL GRANT-IN-Am PRo AMS (adopted December 7, 1971).
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federal office building. The complainant adversely affected by the
action of a state or local government or private organization is most
likely to direct his grievance to that body. He may not even be aware
that federal funds support the action which is the basis of the complaint
and is unlikely to think of directing his complaint initially to the fed-
eral agency. The complainant is only interested in getting his normal
check from the city welfare department or in convincing the state high-
way department to provide him with additional relocation assistance.
His contacts have been entirely with officials of state or local agencies
or of private organizations in the community, and he naturally turns to
those officials with his complaint. Those officials are the appropriate
ones to handle his complaint, because action to remedy the situation
which led to the complaint is most likely to come from them. They
have ready access to the information necessary to determine the validity
of the complaint and should have the ability and authority to act
quickly where the complaint is valid. For these reasons Part A provides
that the federal agency should normally refer to the grantee any com-
.plaints of individual mistreatment.
Part B provides that a grantee's complaint procedures should handle
all types of complaints by persons affected by the grantee's federally
assisted activities and should not be limited to complaints that a grantee
is violating federal standards. The principal consideration supporting
the broader coverage is the ignorance of most complainants of the real
basis for their complaints. The complainant believes that he has been
hurt by the action of some city or state department. Often the com-
plaint may be unfounded. The complainant's real need may be for
adequate information."" Even if the complaint is justified, the com-
plainant may not know enough about the operation of the program to
articulate how the action complained of violates federal, state, or local
requirements. The complainant is probably unaware of any federal
standards involved and is therefore unable to formulate his complaint
in terms of a violation of these standards. The grantee's complaint
procedure should therefore cover all types of complaints and should
perform, in addition to a remedial function, an informational and refer-
ral one. Thus, if a complaint is directed to the wrong body, the state
or local agency or private organization which receives the complaint
should dispose of it by directing the complainant to the appropriate
place.
168 See W. GE.LHORN, WH-I AMERICANS CoMPAIN': GOVERNMENTAL GRIEVANCE
POCEDURES 153-56 (1966).
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Structure of the Grantee's Complaint Procedures
Part B allows grantees to structure their own complaint pro-
cedures, subject to the requirement that the procedures afford a com-
plainant affected by an action of the grantee a fair opportunity to con-
test that action. The plural "procedures" is used throughout the recom-
mendation to emphasize that grantees may develop alternative complaint
procedures to handle different types of complaints. For example, com-
plaints of corruption may be referred through prescribed channels to
an official watchdog, while complaints of improper termination of
statutory benefits may be handled in accordance with distinctly dif-
ferent procedures. The need for flexibility is particularly strong where
state and local governments are grantees. The structure of state and
local government itself varies greatly throughout the country, and each
grantee government should have some range of choice concerning how
best to integrate any new complaint mechanism into the existing gov-
ernmental structure. In most cases, the existing structure will already
include some mechanism for the handling of citizen's grievances. Fur-
thermore, most state and local governments participate in a number
of federal programs and should have the authority to coordinate or
combine the complaint procedures for these programs.
Part B contemplates an internal complaint mechanism run by the
grantee or a separate agency established by the state or local govern-
ment to handle complaints concerning a number of programs. In each
instance, that agency should have authority to resolve complaints and
not just to bring administrative abuses to the attention of the public.69
The purpose of the complaint mechanism is both to provide adequate
information to all complainants on the nature of the program and to
redress those individual complaints that are justified.
A grantee's operation of a federally assisted program is likely to en-
gender a broad variety of complaints, such as complaints of rudeness
or discourtesy by grantee officials, complaints that a grantee's mode of
operation unnecessarily injures the complainant, complaints that the
grantee is harassing the complainant, and complaints that the grantee
has improperly deprived the complainant of an individual benefit or
169 Unlike numerous recent discussions on the redress of citizen's grievances, this is
not a proposal for an "ombudsman." The path-breaking work on this topic is W.
GELLHoRN, WHER AMERICANS COMPLAIN: GoVERNMENTAL GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES (1966).
For other literature on the ombudsman issue, see S. ANDERsoN, OmBxusmAN FOR
AMERICAN GOVERNMNT? (1968); Tibbles, The Ombudsman: Who Needs Hhn? 47 J.
OlF URBAN L. 1 (1969).
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protection to which he is entitled under the grant-in-aid program. The
type of hearing which the grantee should afford the complainant should
depend on the nature of the issues involved and the identity and in-
terests of the complainant. In all cases the complainant should have
the right to submit data and argument in support of the complaint,
either in the form of written submissions or through an informal oral
presentation to an official of the grantee.
Where the complainant claims that the grantee has deprived him of
welfare benefits, a tenancy in public housing, or any other individual
benefit or protection to which he is entitled under the grant-in-aid pro-
gram, due process requires that the grantee afford the complainant an
adjudicatory hearing on all contested issues of fact.170 Unfortunately,
judicial decisions do not delineate the precise scope of this require-
ment. Unsettled questions remain concerning whether due process
requires an adjudicatory hearing when there is an initial denial or later
reduction of benefits or when the benefit at stake does not have the
same crucial importance to the recipient as do welfare benefits or public
housing. 7 1 Similarly, the law is unclear as to the extent to which the
due process clause requires private grantees to afford hearings to ulti-
mate beneficiaries of a grant program who are adversely affected by
a grantee's action. 72
Federal grantor agencies should react affirmatively to this uncertain
situation by defining the classes of cases where fairness requires thAt
the grantee afford the complainant an adjudicatory hearing on con-
tested issues of fact. On the one hand, complaints about the location
of a highway do not involve the deprivation of any individual benefit
or entitlement but raise policy issues about the merits of the particular
highway. On the other hand, a homeowner's eligibility for relocation
benefits or the amount to which he is entitled deserves different treat-
ment. In these latter situations federal grantor agencies should not
force complainants to go to court to assert their rights to an adjudicatory
hearing but should require as a grant condition that the grantee afford
170 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 US. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits); Escalera v., New York
Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970) (public housing).
171 O'Neil, Of Justice Delayed and Justice Denied: The Welfare Prior Hearing
Cases, 1970 SuPRE E COURT Rrv. 161, 202-13.
172The cases in this area have generally involved tenants in federally subsidized
private housing developments. See Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296
(2d Cir. 1971) (tenants not entided to a hearing on rent increases even though there
were adjudicative facts involved); McQueen v. Drucker, 317 F. Supp. 1122 (D, Mass.
1970) (evicted tenant entitled to a hearing on whether the landlord had "good cause"),
aff'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971). ", "; f
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such a hearing to complainants. In defining those cases where adjudica- -
tory hearings are necessary, the federal agency should not limit itself
to minimum due process standards as defined by the courts but should
go further and draw upon its broad knowledge of its own grant-in-aid
programs to determine those categories of cases where formal adjudi-
catory hearings would be desirable.
Because of the impact on grantor agencies in terms of work load and
the difficulties of accommodating federal agency review with state judi-
cial review, disappointed claimants in a grantee proceeding should not
normally be permitted to appeal an adverse decision to the grantor
agency. Taking AFDC as an example, there are difficult problems in
trying to correlate state judicial review'7 3 with federal administrative
review. Assuming, as is customary, that the unsuccessful complainant in
a fair hearing has raised issues both of the interpretation and the appli-
cation of the state regulations or statutes, as well as their conformity to
federal requirements as interpreted and applied in his case, he will have
both federal and state grounds for review. His federal ground can, of
course, be raised in a state court review proceeding. But were there
also an appeal in individual cases to HEW, it is unlikely that the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare would take the respon-
sibility for finally determining the interpretation of state law. Hence,
in review by HEW the state department's interpretation would have
to be followed. Knowing this the claimant might concurrently pursue
a state judicial remedy involving the state in two separate procedures.
Indeed, the plaintiff might be required to pursue state judicial remedies
first, since it is arguable that HEW should not make a conformity ruling
where there is a contested issue of interpretation of state law. Assuming
that state remedies were first pursued, should the claimant be allowed
to omit from his state review claim the claim that federal law is being
violated? If so, he would be able to pursue the state on that question
through the HEW administrative remedy should he lose on his state law
grounds in the state court. Alternatively, if he should raise, or be
required to raise, the federal question in the state court proceeding and
lose on that issue, would he then be barred on res judicata grounds
from pursuing the administrative remedy established by the federal
department?
The grantor and grantee complaint procedures here proposed avoid
173 A search of state statutes indicates that in thirty states there is a clear right to
judicial review of an adverse public assistance determination; in thirteen states there
seems to be a prohibition of judicial review, and in seven states the situation is unclear.
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these potential pitfalls by separating the two procedures and by making
the federal grantor procedure discretionary. Complainants alleging sub-
stantial noncompliance or noncompliance in areas of particular federal
concern, such as nondiscrimination, may proceed directly to the fed-
eral complaint procedure, while individual complaints in other cases
should be lodged with the grantee. Of course, nothing prohibits an
individual complainant from filing a complaint with the grantor, should
he be dissatisfied with the grantee's determination and have grounds for
asserting the existence of substantial noncompliance or of a strong fed-
eral interest. The federal grantor agency would have discretion to de-
cline to process complaints having this sort of history should the
agency consider resort to state judicial review more appropriate.
The Need for Effective Grantee Complaint Procedures
In view of "the increasing involvement of government officials in
the lives of citizens, adequate procedures for the consideration of such
individual grievances as citizens may have against such officials are
essential to effective government." 174 Unfortunately, the existing pro-
cedures for redressing citizens' grievances are inadequate. The Kerner
Commission, for instance, found that the lack of an accessible and visible
means for establishing the merits of grievances against agencies of state
and local government was a source of tension and frustration among
ghetto residents. 7 5 Recent proposals to establish the office of ombuds-
man have also been based on the belief that existing mechanisms for
handling Complaints are inadequate. Citizens' complaints are presently
handled primarily by elected' legislative and executive officials who
consider the task a service to their constituents. Only rarely do either
watchdog executive agencies or formal administrative complaint pro-
cedures within operating agencies play a significant role. The federal
government should take some initiative to ensure that complaints di-
recfed at the operation of federally assisted programs are properly
resolved.
The considerations that support grantee complaint procedures for
governmental bodies are not fully applicable to private grantees. In
addition, these private grantees may find unfamiliar their new role of
resolving grievances. While state and local governments are accustomed
to: this role because they have always necessarily, recognized their
174 PARSWENT'S Comm'N oN LAw E-NFORcEmENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION DF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OP CRI1M.1 IN AFREg. SIocI= 103 (1967).
179 REPORT .fl THE NATIONAL, ADVISORY COQiMN ON" CIVIL'DISoRDERS 151 (21968),
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accountability to the governed, private organizations tend to view them-
selves as more independent and not responsible to a constituency.
Part B nevertheless recommends that both public and private grantees
develop administrative complaint procedures.'" It would be incon-
gruous for the federal grantor agency to require some grantees to
establish complaint mechanisms but not require others to do so. The
dividing line between public and private in these areas is too blurred
to support such a distinction. Community action agencies, for example,
may be governmental units or public agencies or private nonprofit
organizations; but if they are nonprofit organizations, they must be
formally designated as a community action agency by a governmental
unit. In all cases the community action agency is performing a public
function. Most privately endowed hospitals and universities that receive
federal grants likewise recognize that they are performing a public
function and that they have responsibilities to the public at large. In
order to obtain federal grants, these institutions must normally work
through a state health or education agency that has developed a com-
prehensive state plan for meeting the state's responsibilities in the area.
Private grantees that are not prepared to operate their own complaint
procedures may assign the task to the state agency and direct to it all
complaints concerning their operations. In many programs it would
seem sensible for the state agency to handle complaints directed at
both public and private grantees and in this fashion to centralize the
complaint process. Whether such an arrangement would remove the
complaint procedure too far from the source of the complaints depends
on the balance of state and local involvement in the particular grant
program.
Part B and Existing Agency Practices
The HEW experience suggests that the difficulties in structuring an
appropriate complaint procedure at the state level may be considerable.
These difficulties may involve the federal government in extensive
regulation of the state complaint procedure and in attempts to enforce
additional federal standards. This is not necessarily to say, however,
that the game is not worth the candle.
The Department of Health, Education -and Welfare has extensive
experience with state grievance procedures. Since 1935 Title IV of the
176The grant-in-aid programs -involving substantial numbers of private grantees
which are covered by this recommendation are, in addition to iubsidized Piivate
housing developments, in the health, education, and antipoverty areas.
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Social Security Act 77 has required that states employ a "fair hearing"
procedure whereby disappointed claimants of public assistance may
appeal a determintion of ineligibility, reduction of grant, or more re-
cently, failure to act with reasonable promptness upon a grant request.
The legislative hearings on the 1935 Social Security Act' 78 reveal that
there was little understanding in Congress or the Social Security Board
concerning what the "fair hearing" requirement would mean. Every-
one understood that it would require some kind of review beyond an
initial administrative determination, but the administration's witnesses,
testifying before the House Ways and Means Committee, indicated
that the federal government through the Social Security Board would
promulgate no standards beyond those contained in the statute con-
cerning what might constitute an appropriate fair hearing procedure.
According to the administration, the standard for reviewing state plans
in the Social Security Board would be whether the state proceedings
were "utterly unfair." Congressman Vinson, however, did not accept
the approach of "leave it to the states, they will be fair." If this were
true, Vinson thought that the Congress might as well omit the fair
hearing requirement altogether. HEW has over the years come to the
Vinson view that considerable further regulation is necessary in order
to have an effective fair hearing procedure.1 79
By 1968 the Handbook of Public Assistance Administration required
the states to meet twelve basic conditions in establishing a fair hearing
proceeding. 80 The fundamental nature of most of these requirements
gives some idea of the resistance that HEW must have encountered
from the states. The requirements include, for example, the following:
(1) that decisions of the hearing authority be binding on state and local
agencies,"" (2) that hearings be conducted by an impartial official of
the state agency,182 (3) that in the presentation of his case the claimant
be allowed to make the presentation himself or with the aid of others,
177 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (4) (1970).
178 Hearings on HR. 4120 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935).
179 The only amendment to the statutory fair hearing language has been the addition
of provisions in 1950 which require "fair hearings" where an applicant's request for
benefits ". . . is not acted upon with reasonable promptness." Social Security Act
Amendments of 1950, ch. 809 S 321(a), 64 Stat. 477, 479. Nonetheless, the regulatory
activity has been extensive in recent years.
180 THE DEPARTmETr OF HEALTf, EDucATiox AND W-YLARE, Tim HAMBOOx or PUBLIC
AssisTANcE ADMrnISTRATION, Part IV, S 6200 (February 8, 1968).
1811d., at S 6200(i).
182 Id., at § 6200(d).
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to bring witnesses, to establish all pertinent facts and circumstances, to
advance any and all arguments without interference, and to question
or refute any testimony or evidence put forth by the state or local
agency- 183
Even requirements such as these proved insufficient. Pending the
decision in Goldberg v. Kelly,'" HEW promulgated regulations, to
take effect July 1, 1970, which would have required continuation of
assistance payments until the completion of any fair hearing raising an
issue of fact or judgment concerning the application of state policy
to the facts of an individual case and that the services of lawyers be
made available to welfare applicants and recipients who desired them in
fair hearings. Goldberg v. Kelly found the first requirement a part of
minimum due process in the determination of public assistance claims
but failed to require the provision of legal services. After the Goldberg
decision, and in connection with a general codification of the Handbook
of Public Assistance Administration requirements into 45 C.F.R., HEW
promulgated more explicit requirements concerning the continuation
of assistance but withdrew the requirement that legal services be pro-
vided. The new regulations, which took effect April 14, 1971, do little
more than codify the pre-existing Handbook requirements with the
addition of those due process requirements set forth in Goldberg and
not previously included in the Handbook, to wit, that a claimant be
afforded an opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination of
adverse witnesses and that the decision-maker, in order to demonstrate
compliance with the requirement of decision on the record, state the
reasons for his determination and indicate the evidence upon which he
relied. Some of the other requirements previously in the Handbook
are further explicated in the new regulations, and there is the new
requirement that, if requested, a state agency must provide a group
fair hearing on issues of state policy.
All of these requirements for fair hearings are obviously thought by
HEW to be necessary to make meaningful the statutory requirement
that a state plan have a fair hearing procedure. The federal agency
found that it could not simply require a hearing and expect that the
states would themselves establish hearing processes which fit the par-
ticular needs of the welfare clientele and of the issues raised by welfare
claims.
Unfortunately, the problem of securing a viable state complaint
188 Id., at S 6200(i).' '
184 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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procedure does not end with stating requirements. Recent studies sug-
gest that there may be massive noncompliance by the states with the
federal requirements. A study of the fair hearing process in all of the
states by Robert E. Scott,8 5 for example, found that state compliance
with twelve requirements bearing directly on the fairness and avail-
ability of the hearing process ranged from seventy-five per cent to
twenty-five per cent compliance. 18 6 In a survey conducted for purposes
of this Article of the states comprising Region III of BEW,8 7 similar
noncompliance was discovered. For one reason or another, every state
in the region is out of compliance with federal law on at least one
requirement concerning access to the fair hearing procedure or the
actual fairness of the procedure. In most states there are substantial
limitations on fair hearing rights as defined by federal regulation. More-
over, the fact that a state handbook or statute carries a provision which
apparently complies is no guarantee of actual compliance. In Virginia,
for example, there is no substantial compliance in some local offices
with the requirements for oral explanation of appeal rights, aid in pre-
paring an appeal, or availability of previous fair hearing decisions,
although the state manual contains requirements on all of these counts.8 s
The HEW experience suggests that there will probably be resistance
on the state or local level to the establishment of a grantee's complaint
procedure. It seems likely, therefore, that the type of hearing that
should be required, at what time, with what procedure will have to be
spelled out in detail by the federal agency in order to have any real
impact on the operations of the grantee. Moreover, because of its
185 Scott, The Regulation & Administration of the Welfare Hearing Process-The
Need for Administrative Responsibility, 11 W. & M. L. REv. 291 (1969).
186 Indeed, there is reason to believe that even these percentages vastly overstate the
actual compliance with federal regulations. They are based wholly on an analysis of
the language of the statutes and regulations and do not account for the substantial non-
compliance which may result from the administration of the system by state welfare
officers.
187 R. Stevens & D. Kirstein, Regional Office Administration, 1971, (unpublished paper)
on file at the Virginia Law Review.
188 See Mashaw, Welfare Reform and Legal Administration of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children in Virginia, 57 VA. L. REv. 818 (1971). The HUD experience
has been similar to that of HEW. HUD has also defined precise grievance procedures
which local housing authorities (LHA's) must afford their tenants. When the tenant
contests an action, he must be provided an opportunity to present his side of the
dispute before an impartial official or before a hearing panel. The tenant has a right
to call witnesses, to be represented by counsel of his choice, and to confront witnesses.
The official or.panel that conducts the hearing-must notify the tenant of its decision
and its findings of fact and law. See Lefcoe, HUD's Authority, to Mandate Tenant's
Rights in Public Housing, 80 Yrmz Lj. 463 (1971).
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impact on grantee compliance with federal standards in general, the
requirements for grantee complaint procedures should be a priority
item in the grantor agency's enforcement program. Individual com-
plaints concerning the grantee complaint procedure should be treated
as "important for the effectuation of federal policy" for purposes of
the grantor's complaint process.
C. The Information System189
The federal grantor agency should ensure that persons affected by
a grant-in-aid program receive adequate information about the pro-
gram, in order that they may take advantage of the federal and the
grantee complaint procedures. The federal grantor agency should
require as a grant condition that all program materials (regulations,
handbooks, manuals, etc.) governing the grantee's administration of
a program supported in whole or in part by federal grant-in-aid funds
and all plans, applications, and other documents required to be sub-
mitted to the federal agency as a condition to the receipt of federal
funds should be readily accessible to persons affected or likely to be
affected by the operation of the funded program. Plans, applications,
and other documents that provide the basis for federal funding
should be made readily accessible to interested persons no later than
the time of their submission to the grantor agency for approval and
at an earlier time when required by law.
The federal grantor agency should ensure that the grantee's system
for dissemination of program materials and grant submissions takes
account of the nature, location, and representation of affected persons.
For example, as a part of a plan to make such materials readily accessi-
ble, program information might be deposited not only in the offices of
the grantee but also in public and university libraries and in the offices
of affected interest groups and their legal representatives. It might
also be necessary to require descriptive summaries of technical rules
or project applications or to require an oral explanation of program
features (for example, the complaint procedure) which are critical to
the protection of a beneficiary's interests. The federal agency should
make parallel efforts to disseminate materials relating to its adminis-
tration of the federal grant program.
Part C of this recommendation recognizes that, in order for a
complaint procedure to be effective, the affected populace must have
189 The Administrative conference has slightly altered the language of Part C. AD-
MmImsTATh7E CONFERENcE OF Tm UN=rED STATES, RECOMMENDATION 31: ENFORCEM.ENT
or STANDARDS IN FE-EAL GRA N-nt-Am PROcRAMS (adopted December 7, 1971).
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adequate and timely information, concerning both the federal grant
program and the grantee's or potential grantee's participation in that
program. Only if this information is available will affected persons be
able to determine intelligently whether there is any basis for a complaint
that federal standards have not been met. Part C is directed specifically
at aspects of the general problem of accessibility of information which
are particularly relevant to the adequate functioning of complaint pro-
cedures. It does not deal, except incidentally, with public information
issues which might arise in the context of implementing general policies
for broadening public participation in agency decision-making or for
better informing potential grantees of the availability of federal funds.
The basic information component for an effective complaint pro-
cedure is the accessibility of documents which govern the administration
of the funded program by both the grantor and the grantee. At the fed-
eral level these documents will include the applicable statutes, regula-
tions, agency handbooks or manuals, and any descriptive literature or
orders which contain agency interpretations or opinions concerning
the proper administration of the relevant grant program. Similar docu-
ments describing the grantee's operations should also be made accessible.
In addition, affected persons should have access to any plans, appli-
cations, reports, or other documents which a grantee is required to sub-
mit to the federal grantor agency as a basis for initial or continued
federal funding.
Part C covers only documents that are current; it is not intended to
affect a grantor's or grantee's policy with respect to the preservation
and storage of outdated plans or applications that are no longer opera-
tive. The documents covered by the recommendation are generally
public; they almost never contain confidential material, and, when
filed with the federal agency, they are generally obtainable from it by
any person under the Freedom of Information Act. 90 Present pro-
cedures already provide a means by which many of them are easily
made available for public inspection. For example, plans and applica-
tions of governmental grantees are generally made public at the state
or local level before they are submitted to the federal agency, since
they normally must be approved by the relevant units of state and local
government. Project applications for construction and developmental
grants also must be cleared with state, regional, or metropolitan plan-
ning councils in order to assure area-wide coordination of federal assist-
190.5 U.S.C. § 552 (1967).
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ance programs. 91 This process of clearinghouse review assures that
at least those persons within the grantee fraternity or with contacts at
the state or local government level will be aware of plans and appli-
cations that are pending or in effect. In addition, a significant number
of federal assistance programs require that there be public hearings on
individual project applications or that private citizens participate in
the overall planning process for the federal grant.
Part C supplements these existing mechanisms and seeks to ensure that
in all cases persons affected by a grant-in-aid program receive adequate
information about the operation of the program, in order that they
may take advantage of the federal and the grantee complaint procedures.
The recommendation also recognizes that the simple availability of the
relevant documents may not be adequate to inform affected persons of
the requirements surrounding the administration of the funded program.
Hence, it may be necessary to require special techniques for the dissemi-
nation of this information.
Information Accessibility as a Grant Condition
Part C provides for the accessibility of information by attaching a
condition to the federal grant. The operational responsibility will
therefore be on the grantee to make its program materials and submis-
sions accessible in accordance with whatever specific requirements are
contained in the grant condition. The federal grantor agency should
impose similar requirements upon itself with respect to the accessibility
of federal program materials and should make parallel efforts to dis-
seminate those materials.
This means for dissemination of grantee program material and sub-
missions was chosen because it is likely to be more effective than the
only available alternative, federal grantor dissemination. The grantee
will necessarily be better equipped, due to the proximity of its opera-
tions to the affected populace, to make the relevant information accessi-
ble. Moreover, to charge federal grantor agencies with the collection
and dissemination of all grantee program materials and submissions
would be extremely burdensome and would conflict with emerging
federal policies for the simplification of the grant application process
by the use of proclaimers. The resources of the federal agency devoted
191 See BREATU OF THm Btrc-r, REvisED CimcuLaR A-95 (Feb. 9, 1971) which imple-
ments 5 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966,
42 U.S.C. 5 3334 (1970), and Title IV of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of
1968,42 U.S.C. § 4222 (1970).
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to enforcement of grantee compliance with federal standards can almost
certainly be better utilized in the investigation of critical compliance
areas and in the investigation and resolution of complaints concerning
state systems than in handling thousands of pieces of paper reflecting
every modification of grantee regulations. Of course, to the extent
that the federal agency has relevant documents concerning the grantee's
program on file, it should make them accessible to interested parties
in conformity with the Freedom of Information Act 92 and Adminis-
trative Conference Recommendation No. 24..'a
Time of Availability
It is important that adequate information concerning a grantee's
plans, applications, or other submissions that provide the basis for fed-
eral funding be available at an early stage in the funding process. This
will facilitate objections by affected parties at a stage where the federal
agency is best able to obtain compliance with federal standards. The
resolution of compliance questions at this early stage is not likely to
disrupt the grantee's operations. The recommendation suggests that the
latest the information should be disseminated is the time of submission
of any plan, project application, or other document for approval by
the federal agency. The suggestion that information be accessible to
the public at the time of submission for approval is, of course, a mini-
mum standard and is not meant to replace any existing requirements
for earlier accessibility, for example, in connection with required
public hearings or other citizen participation.
"Approval," as used in the recommendation, does not necessarily
mean final approval of a project. Final approval may come at a very
late stage in the grant process and after a series of prior approvals of
various steps in the project. Nor does "approval" necessarily connote
an action which definitively commits federal funds. Such a commit-
ment occurs in the federal-aid-highways program, for example, only
after submission of plans, specifications, and estimates. This submis-
sion may occur years after initial approval of a highway department's
decision on the location of a project. A submission for approval under
this recommendation includes any submission which is required as a
1925 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
193 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE oF THE UNITED STATES, 1970-71, REPoRT 52, RECOM-
MENDATioN 24: UNFom PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEM nNG THE FREEDOM OF INFORMAnoN
AcT (adopted June, 1971).
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part of the process of approving the initiation or continuance of fed-
eral funding. 194
It should be recognized that a requirement of accessibility of grantee
plans and project applications at the time of their submission for ap-
proval will have different effects in certain formula grant programs than
it will in project grant programs. In the case of formula grants for
categorical public assistance programs, for example, the provisions of
a state's plan will normally be submitted for approval after those pro-
visions have gone into effect as a part of the state's statutory or regu-
latory scheme. Any complaint concerning such a submission thus will
be directed to a finding that state law is out of compliance with federal
standards, rather than, as in the project grant context, at a finding
merely that the application is not acceptable in its present form. Con-
sequently, the complaint mechanism may be somewhat less useful for
formula grants than for project grants. In the former case the affected
parties are likely to be informed of the grantee's policies after decisions
have been made and to some degree implemented, rather than while
positions are still fluid.
This difficulty might suggest that some special provisions for inform-
ing the public be made in those programs where changes in state law
or regulations are systematically translated into amendments to state
plans, or indeed, in any situation where the grantee's program policies
become effective prior to their submission for federal grantor approval.
Any such recommendation, however, would have extensive conse-
quences concerning public participation in grantee decision-making in
general and should be approached from that perspective. This Article
thus does not attempt to answer the questions of what form such par-
ticipation should take and how federal requirements might be coordi-
nated with state administrative procedure acts.
The Form of Information and Techniques for
Making It Accessible
Because Part C covers a large number of relatively disparate grant
programs, there has been, no attempt to provide detailed guidelines for
public information programs. Rather, the recommendation seeks to
present a series of considerations which should animate both the federal
agency's efforts to disseminate information concerning the federal pro-
194 This generally accords with the notions of finality that have been employed by
federal courts in judicial review of agency actions. See, e.g., Named Individual Members
of the San Antonio Conservation Soe'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (1971).
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gram and the public information requirements it imposes on its grantees.
The basic consideration is adequacy of information with respect to
utilization of the complaint procedures. In developing an adequate pro-
gram of public information, the federal agency should also consider
the "nature, location and representation" of the persons with whom it
seeks to communicate and, of course, the nature of its particular pro-
gram.
Federal Agency Efforts-A recurrent difficulty in dealing with federal
grant programs is the discovery of what the federal standards are which
condition the receipt of federal grant moneys. In part this difficulty
stems from the failure of grant agencies to use the informal rule making
procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, including publication
of standards in the Federal Register.195 The result is that federal stand-
ards may be contained in compilations ranging from the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations to informational circulars distributed only to grantees.
Certain agencies, such as HEW, have made considerable progress in
putting mandatory federal grant standards into regulatory form and
publishing them in the Federal Register. Other agencies, such as the
Federal Highway Administration, have not done nearly so well.
FHWA policies are still largely contained in a series of administrative,
instructional, and policy and procedure memoranda which are, to say
the least, difficult to use. Moreover, most grant or agency handbooks,
manuals, and circulars contain everything from mandatory standards
to helpful hints. In order adequately to inform interested persons con-
cerning the operation of federal grant programs, many agencies should
conform to previous recommendations of the Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States concerning the use of the Federal Register
for the publication of mandatory standards and compile all their direc-
tory materials into a single set of policy guidelines clearly labelled as
to their intended effect. The federal agencies also should be attentive
to details, such as subject-matter indexing, descriptive synopses, and
identification of available "public information" personnel, which may
make the difference between effective and ineffective communication
of the substance of federal requirements.
In part the failure to put grant standards into a documentary form
more readily accessible to the public may be the result of a mistaken
195 See, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, I RECOMMENDATIONS AND
REPORTS 305 (1970), Recommendation 16: Elimination of Certain Exemptions from the
APA Rulemaldng requirements; ADMImSTRATIvE CoNFRENCE OF THE UNrT5 STAES,
1970-71 Report 58, RECOMMENDATION 26: MINiMUm -PROCEDUREs FOR AoGNCWS ADMIN-
ISTERING DISCRETIONARY GRANT PROGRAMS (1970).
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notion on the part of federal agencies as to the impact of federal grant
cbnditions on the rights and privileges of intended beneficiaries. The
Federal Highway Administration, for example, has adopted a regula-
tion stating that its memoranda setting forth requirements for grantees
provide no rights or privileges not explicitly set forth therein. 9 6 Yet,
surely the teaching of cases such as Barlow v. Collins'7 is that persons
adversely affected may rely upon federal grant standards as a basis for
challenging agency action, even in situations where they have no indi-
vidual entitlement at stake. Cases involving judicial review of highway
grant decisions by the FHWA have, since Road Review League v.
Boyd,98 consistently taken this view of standing. And, of course, where
individual rights or privileges are being sought, the position is a fortiori
the same.199 Similarly, for the purposes of the recommended complaint
procedures any mandatory federal grant standard may provide the basis
for a complaint by persons adversely affected by the actions of the
grantee or by the grantor agency's funding decisions.
Finally, in order to determine whether there is an adequate basis for
complaint concerning a grantee's or potential grantee's compliance with
federal standards, affected persons need to have access to both grantor
and grantee program materials in the same place and the same form.
Hence, the efforts of federal agencies to disseminate federal program
materials should parallel those required for grantees in making the latter
materials accessible.
Requirements for Grantees-Grant conditions merely requiring that
a grantee make its program materials accessible will not necessarily
be sufficient to discharge the grantor agency's obligation to ensure that
affected persons are adequately informed. Different types of programs
minister to the needs of different clienteles and require different tech-
niques for effective communication. Many grantor agencies already
recognize this problem and are experimenting with creative approaches
to the dissemination of public information.
The Social and Rehabilitation Service in HEW, for example, has
extensive public information regulations specifically designed to facili-
tate the utilization by welfare recipients of a state's fair hearing pro-
cedure for resolving complaints. SRS requires that state plan materials
in the form of program manuals and other statements of agency policy
196 35 Fed. Reg. 6322 (1970).
197 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
198 270 F. Supp. 650 (SD.N.Y. 1967).
199 E.g., Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
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affecting the public be maintained in the state office and each local
or district office and be available to the public through custodians.m
SRS further requires that states give specific notice to welfare appli-
cants or recipients, both at the time of initial application and at the
time of any subsequent action concerning the applicant or recipient's
case, of the existence of the fair hearing procedure. 01
The FHWA relies heavily on public hearings as a technique for
disseminating public information. While there has been a great deal
of criticism of these public hearings, it has largely been with reference
to their utility as a device for public participation in decision-making.
Certainly the public hearing is a far better informational device than
mere newspaper advertisements, and the affected public is usually too
large to give fully effective individualized notice of proposals for
projects. Under present procedures applicable to location hearings,
for example,20 2 the state highway department must publish notice of a
proposed hearing in local newspapers and mail copies of the notice to
all public officials and citizen groups that have requested notice of
highway department hearings or that "by nature of their function,
interests or responsibility the highway department knows or believes
might be interested" in the proposed project.20 3 The notice must con-
tain a description of the proposed project and specify that maps, draw-
ings, and other pertinent information developed by the state highway
department are available at a convenient location in the vicinity of




Despite their clear informational value, even these procedures can
be improved. For example, while highway departments must provide
200 Custodians must request the material, be centrally located and accessible to a
substantial portion of the recipient population, and agree to accept responsibility for
filing all amendments and changes forwarded by the agency. These custodians are:
libraries, local offices of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, legal service organizations, and
organizations of welfare recipients. 45 C.F.R. S 205.70 (1971).
20145 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (92) (1971). Synopses of decisions in previous fair hearings
must also be made available to the public. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a) (16) (1971). It is not
clear, however, whether these materials are to be maintained and made available in the
same manner as the grantee's regulations and other statements of agency policy.
202
FEDERL HiGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, PoLIcY AND PROCEDURE MEMORANDUM 20-8
[hereinafter cited as PPM], 23 C.F.R. § 1.38, App. A (1972) requires state highway
departments to hold two public hearings on most federally aided highway projects.
There must be an initial corridor hearing on the social, economic, and environmental
effects of the route location and then a design hearing on the effects of the highway
design. The provisions applicable to both the corridor and the design hearings are
virtually identical.
203 PPM 20-8, § 8(b) (2), 23 C.F.R. § 1.38, App. A (1972).
204 PPM 20-8, § 8(a) (3), 23 C.F.R. § 1.38, App. A (i972).
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individual notification of hearings to persons requesting it prior to a
location or design hearing, they are required only to publicize by
newspaper notice that a decision has been made and transmitted to the
FHWA for approval. 20 5 Because this is the point at which aggrieved
parties are most likely to wish to file a complaint and because there
may be a significant interval between the public hearing and a location
or design decision, a more effective means of publicizing these decisions
seems desirable.
The FHWA also provides the public access to information by means
other than public hearings. For example, DOT's new regulations under
the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Land Acquisition Policies Act2
require a state highway department (1) to present its relocation pro-
gram at all public hearings on a highway project, (2) to prepare
brochures on its relocation program, (3) to announce publicly its
relocation program through appropriate mass media, (4) to post notices
on the relocation program in or on buildings to be acquired, and (5)
to mail by certified mail individual notices on the relocation program to
all persons to be displaced. Displacees are also to be informed of their
rights to relocation assistance and payments and to appeal any adverse
determination on their eligibility for relocation payments or the amount
thereof to the head of the state agency. 0 7 The information system is
thus designed to facilitate the use of the grantee's complaint procedure.
The present practice of the Federal Highway Administration sug-
gests another public information problem to which agencies should give
attention. The system of project grants tends to presume that infor-
mation has been made available on the local level at an early stage in
the development of the project through the local planning process. In
programs like federal aid for highways, the application by a state
highway department for program approval, the first step in the funding
process, comes to the FHWA with the imprimatur of state and local
assurance that the project conforms to local and statewide planning
and that environmental considerations have been addressed in at least
a preliminary form. Attached to each initial application must be docu-
mentation indicating that the Bureau of the Budget A-95 review pro-
cedure has been followed, 08 that is, that the proposed program has been
referred to and received by a wide range of state and local officials.
205PPM 208, § 10-11, 23 C.F.R. § 1.38, App. A (1972).
20642 U.S.C. § 3307 (1970).
20749 C.F.R. H 25.83-25.93 (1972).
20sSee generally, Intergovernmental Information Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 4222 (1970).
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Unless issues such as needs of the localities, confoimity with local
planning, or environmental, economic, or social concerns are raised by
state or local officials, the FHWA will not raise these questions at the
'application stage nor seek to disseminate information on the project
outside official channels. The FHWA's position is that since comments
through the BOB A-95 review procedure come largely from elected
officials of the states and localities, affirmative comments or no com-
ments should be taken as reflecting the public interest as determined
through the appropriate political process. The FHWA is not in the
business of reforming local government.The FHWA's attitude, however, seems to miss the point that the
federal-aid highways program has already "reformed" local govern-
ment by vesting great political power in the state highway departments.
If local officials, for this reason or for others, fail to provide the sort
of critical review of projects which ensures conformity with the rele-
'vant federal standards, the FHWA should not thereby be relieved
of its duty to ensure such compliance. In order for citizen complaints
fo id significantly in that effort, it may be necessary for state highway
departments and other project grantees to establish an information
system which makes their 'lans accessible to all affected parties at an
early stage of project planning.
HUD has taken measures to ensure that residents of an urban-renewal
area are able to obtain adequate information about urban renewal plans.
A local public agency applying for an urban renewal grant must estab-
lish a Project Area Committee (PAC)' to assist in the planning and
6xecution of the urban renewal project. The PAC should consist of a
fair cross section of the residents of an urban renewal area and should
receive all information and reports on the project in advance of the
time when decisions are made.209
The procedures required of grantees by SRS, the FHWA, and HUD
-in some respects go beyond what is literally required by Part C, be-
cause that recommendation by itself does not require either public
hearings or citizen participation. The procedures already required,
howevei', indicate possible ways to implement the general principle
stated in Part C within the framework of particular grant programs.
More6ver, they'suggest that even well-developed, existing informational
devices may require modification in connection with the institution
of a regularized complaint procedure.
209 URBAN RENEWAL HANDBOOK, RHA 7217.1. Until the Fall of 1970, PAC's were
mandatory only in urban renewal projects which involved residential rehabilitation.
They are now mandatory in all projects.
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D. Range of Sanctions210
The federal grantor agency should seek to develop an adequate
range of sanctions for ensuring compliance with federal standards by
grantees that apply for or receive federal financial assistance. The
sanction of the total denial or cut-off of federal funds should be re-
tained and used where necessary to obtain compliance, but the agency
should have available lesser sanctions that do not result in the preven-
tion or discontinuance of beneficial programs and projects. This range
of sanctions should include in appropriate cases:
1. The public disclosure by the agency that a grantee has failed to
comply with federal standards;
2. An injunctive action brought by the agency or the Department
of Justice in the federal courts to require the grantee to fulfill any
assurances of compliance with federal standards made by the grantee
or to enforce the federal standards attached to the grant;
3. The disallowance as a program or project cost of an expenditure
by the grantee that does not conform to federal standards or other
partial denial of cut-off of funds that affects only that portion of a
program or project that is not in compliance with federal standards;
4. The imposition of special administrative conditions on grantee
operations, including retroactive awarding of benefits, in order to en-
sure the reparation of any individual damage or prejudice or to correct
any shortcomings in the effectuation of federal policy which have
resulted from failures to comply with federal standards; and
5. The transfer of a grant, or the awarding of subsequent grants
under the same or related grant-in-aid programs, to a different grantee
if the original grantee violates federal standards.
Where an agency lacks statutory authority to invoke one or more
of the above sanctions and such authority would provide an appro-
priate means of ensuring compliance with federal standards in a grant-
in-aid program administered by the agency, it should seek the neces-
sary authority from Congress.
The agency should also consider the provision of incentives, such
210 The administrative Conference has altered D (1) and D (4):
1. The public disclosure by the agency of a grantee's failure to comply with
federal standards and an indication of the steps believed by the agency now to
be appropriate.
4. The imposition on a grantee who has not complied with federal standards
of additional administrative requirements specially designed to assure that the
grantee brings its operations into compliance with federal standards and redresses
the effects of past noncompliance.
ADMIN IsmrAT= CoNTERENcE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMENDATION 31, ENFORCEMENT
OF STANDARDS IN FEDERAL GRANT-IN-AID PROGRAMS (adopted December 7, 1971).
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as the contribution of an increased matching share or the awarding
of additional grant funds, to grantees who comply with certain fed-
eral standards. Where the agency lacks statutory authority to provide
an appropriate means of ensuring compliance with federal standards
in a grant-in-aid program administered by the agency, it should seek
necessary authority from the Congress.
The Federal Complaint Procedure and the
Imposition of Sanctions
Should the federal agency determine that a complaint directed at
a grantee submission or a grantee practice is not valid, it naturally will
take no action on the complaint. The complainant has no further federal
administrative remedies and may pursue any judicial remedies avail-
able. The situation is more complicated if the agency determines that
the complaint is valid. The issue then becomes, how should the federal
agency achieve compliance with federal standards. The agency should,
of course, inform the grantee of its determination and seek to persuade
the grantee to comply with federal standards. If these efforts prove
unsuccessful, the federal agency should consider the imposition of one
or more of the range of sanctions delineated in Part D.
The proposals in this Article distinguish between the disposition of
complaints and the imposition of sanctions for violations of federal
standards. In other words, the federal agency's determination that a
complaint is valid does not automatically result in the imposition of a
sanction, unless, of course, the relevant statute leaves the agency no
discretion. This distinction between the complaint procedure and the
enforcement machinery is desirable for three reasons. First, the federal
agency should not limit its enforcement machinery to instances of
private complaints but should invoke it also where the agency's own
investigations uncover violations of federal standards. Second, the fed-
eral agency should have broad discretion to choose the appropriate
sanctions to invoke. The purpose of providing the agency with a
range of sanctions is to permit it to make a flexible (but effective) re-
sponse to instances of noncompliance. Finally, the enforcement process
should be structured to protect the rights and interests both of the
grantees and of all the beneficiaries of the grant-in-aid program. The
complaint process, on the other hand, should be structured to afford a
fair hearing to the complainant on his grievance.
The distinction between the disposition of complaints and the impo-
sition of sanctions avoids interference with and unnecessary use of
[Vol. 58:600
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procedures otherwise required for the latter action. Prior to the partial
or total discontinuance of federal funding, a grantee or noncomplaining
beneficiary of a program may have a statutory or constitutional right
to a hearing involving formal procedures not employed in the agency's
complaint process. For example, statutes establishing formula grants to
the states for social assistance programs provide that HEW must hold
a conformity hearing prior to terminating a state's grant.21' Affected
private parties have standing to intervene.212 While governmental
grantees may not be "persons" entitled to such a hearing under the due
process clause of the fifth amendment in cases where there is no statu-
tory right to a hearing,213 private grantees may have a due process
right to a hearing prior to the termination of a grant.2 14 Of course, the
federal agency may avoid duplicative hearings by combining the hearing
it affords the complainant with the hearing it must afford the grantee
prior to the imposition of a sanction. This approach is likely to be
appropriate when the complaint raises factual issues which should be
aired at a public hearing.
Where complaints are directed at a grantee's submission, it may not
be possible to separate a finding of noncompliance from the imposition
of sanctions. Once an agency determines that the complaint is valid
and that the submission does not meet federal standards, the agency
may simply disapprove the submission and withhold federal funds. The
agency's decision on the complaint is thus the basis for the agency's
funding decision. In many instances this is no doubt for the best. If
a grantee's initial application for a project grant does not meet federal
standards, the federal agency should not approve it nor fund the
project unless the grantee brings the application into conformity with
federal standards. Likewise, if the agency must make an affirmative
finding that an existing project complies with federal environmental or
relocation standards, the agency cannot make a contrary finding and
permit the project to continue. In these cases the agency's determina-
tion that a complaint is valid necessarily affects the agency's decision
to deny or terminate federal funding for the project.
More flexible responses by the federal agency are appropriate in
other areas. For example, amendments to state plan material in formula
211 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. S 604 (1970) (AFDC).
212 National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
213 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966).
214 Aquavella v. Richardson, 437 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1971) (private nursing home that
provides services under the medicare program entitled to judicial review of termination
proceedings).
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grant programs become effective upon submission to the federal agency.
If the federal agency determines that the amendment does not conform
to federal standards, the agency should seek to obtain compliance with
federal standards through education, persuasion, and, if necessary, the
imposition of one or more of a range of sanctions. Mere disapproval
of the amendment will have little effect unless the federal agency acts
affirmatively to obtain compliance. Since the grant program is already
funded and in operation, the termination of federal funding through
a conformity proceeding may not be the most appropriate sanction; the
federal agency should consider alternative sanctions, such as publicity,
an action seeking an injunction, or audit exceptions.
Although applications for project grants are generally not funded
until approved-and there is a time gap between submission and ap-
proval-the mere disapproval of a noncomplying application often does
not resolve the enforcement problem. Many project grants, such as
grants for highway construction, are approved in stages, and substan-
tial amendments to project applications are common in urban renewal
and related programs. If the federal agency disapproves an amend-
ment to an application or an application for a later stage of an ongoing
project, it in effect terminates funding in midstream. It would seem
appropriate for the federal agency to consider alternative sanctions if
it cannot persuade the grantee to revise its submission to conform with
federal standards.
Part D(1)
,This part proposes that in appropriate cases the federal agency pub-
licize a grantee's noncompliance with federal standards. The use of
publicity as a sanction should prove most effective when coordinated
with the federal administrative complaint procedure proposed in Part
A. The implementation of that procedure should put grantees on notice
that the federal grantor agency is serious about its enforcement re-
sponsibilities, and the publicity generated by individual complaints and
by anypublic proceedings held by the federal agency on the complaints
is likely to induce compliance. Compliance is particularly likely to
result if the federal agency publicizes a strong, well-reasoned decision
that the plan, application, or practice under attack violates federal
standards. The grantee may decide that the wiser course is to comply
with the federal agency's view of the law, or it may attempt to take
the matter to court and comply with the eventual ruling of the court.
In neither case is there an interruption in the federally assisted program.
Federal Standards in Grant-In-Aid Programs
Part D(2)
Part D (2) proposes that in appropriate cases the federal agency or
the Department of Justice sue in the federal courts to compel a grantee
to observe federal standards. Suits for injunctive relief are a potentially
effective sanction for enforcing federal standards in grant-in-aid pro-
grams. Grantee officials are likely to respect any decree issued by- a
court ordering them to comply with federal standards, and if they do
not obey such a decree, they may be held in contempt of court.
The legal basis for enforcement suits of this type is clearly established.
The Supreme Court has on several occasions upheld suits by the United
States to enforce statutory conditions attached to grants of public
land.2 15 A specific grant of authority to the Attorney General is not
required in order for him to sue to enforce the conditions of a grant,
since the Attorney General may sue on behalf of the United States
whenever the United States has an interest to protect. 1 That interest
in these grants cases is a contractual one.21 7 Therefore, "the acceptance
by the recipient of the grant to which the conditions and stipulations
are attached creates an obligation to perform the conditions on the
part of the recipient." 218 Similarly, the United States may sue to en-
force specific assurances of compliance with federal standards made by
grantees of federal financial assistance. For example, suits have been
brought by the Department of Justice to force southern school districts
to implement the school desegregation plans filed with HEW under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a condition for receiving
federal aid. The Department of Justice may institute these suits with-
out satisfying the procedural prerequisites for school desegregation suits
under Title IV of the same Act.2 19
The Department of Justice recently turned to injunctive relief in a
suit against the State of Alabama to force various state agencies admin-
istering a large number of categorical assistance programs to recruit,
hire, promote, and demote their employees on a merit basis without
discrimination on the ground of race or color.2 20 The state agencies in
Alabama had refused to give adequate assurances that they would ob-
215 United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940) (grant to a municipality);
Oregon & Cal. R.R. v. United States, 238 U.S. 393 (1915) (grant to a railroad); McGee
v. Mathis, 71 U.S. 143 (1866) (grant to a state).
216Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
217 McGee v. Mathis, 71 U.S. 143 (1866).
218 United States v. Frazer, 297 F. Supp. 319, 322 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
219 United States v. Board of Educ., 295 F. Supp. 1041 (S.D. Ga. 1969).
220 United States v. Frazer, 297 F. Supp. 319 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (Johnson,. C.J.).
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serve a merit system, but they were nevertheless receiving federal funds
in large amounts. The Department of Justice sued to enforce the con-
ditions attached to those funds. Alabama argued that the statutory
procedures for withholding funds in cases of noncompliance with fed-
eral standards was the exclusive remedy available to the United States.
The court disagreed and denied the state's motion to dismiss the com-
plaint:
This Court is clear to the conclusion that the United States does have
standing to seek judicial enforcement of the terms and conditions of
grants of Federal property and that the administrative remedy of
termination of assistance was not intended to be and is not exclusive.
The argument of the State, if it prevailed, would necessitate this
Court's telling the United States of America that the only remedy it
had in this case would be to administratively terminate the Federal
funds of $150,000,000 a year provided to the State agencies here con-
cerned for assistance to the aged, to families with dependent children,
to crippled children's services, for aid to the blind, aid to the per-
manently and totally disabled, and for other similar programs admin-
istered by the defendants for the benefit of United States citizens
residing in the State of Alabama. 22'
Part D (2) recognizes that enforcement actions in the federal courts
are not appropriate sanctions in all cases. When a federal agency en-
counters noncompliance, it should consider whether court enforce-
ment is an appropriate and effective sanction. If judicial enforcement is
not likely to bring prompt compliance, the agency should invoke one
or more of the remaining sanctions mentioned in Part D, including a
total fund cut-off in cases where the imposition of that sanction is
necessary to obtain compliance. However, court enforcement has not
been utilized enough in the past, and agencies have relied too heavily
on administrative cut-off of funds to offending grantees. Recent social
legislation recognizes this and makes explicit a means of judicial en-
forcement of federal standards. In particular, the Nixon Administra-
tion's bill establishing a Family Assistance Plan, provides that if "the
-Secretary determines that a State plan which he has approved.., no
longer complies with the applicable requirements for approval, or that
in the administration of such plan.., there is a failure to comply sub-
221 d., at 322. Chief Judge Johnson subsequently ruled in favor of the United States
on the merits, finding that the state agencies involved had engaged in massive discrimina-
tion in employment. United States v. Frazer, 317 F. Supp. 1079 (MD. Ala. 1970). He
then entered a broad remedial order which has been appealed by the state to the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
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stantially with any provision of such plan or agreement, the Secretary
may request the Attorney General to bring suit to enforce the provi-
sions of such plan or agreement." 222
An advantage of judicial enforcement is the flexibility inherent in
an equity decree. A federal judge may fashion an equity decree that
provides effective relief from past illegality and prevents future ille-
gality without requiring a fund cut-off. An agency may not have power
to require affirmative action by grantees but can only manipulate to a
greater or lesser extent the purse strings. A court, on the other hand,
can fashion affirmative relief to undo the effects of past discrimination
and to order compliance in the future. This task is a delicate one, and
the federal agency that has expertise in the area should assist the court
in formulating the injunction. That agency can assist the Department
of Justice in enforcement actions brought by the United States and can
participate as an amicus curiae in actions brought by private parties to
enforce federal standards. Agencies should assign high priority to this
task. The result may be that beneficial state and local projects will
continue to function but will be restructured by the court decree to
comply with federal standards.223
Part D(3)
This part recognizes that partial cut-off of federal funds, limited to
2 2 H.R. 16311, October revised revision, 91st Cong., 2d Sess, 5 407(g) (Nov. 5, 1970).
Judicial enforcement of federal standards in formula grant programs may have effects
similar to those of an administrative fund cut-off. Implicit in a court order to comply
with federal statutory standards is the condition expressed by the words, "so long as
you accept federal grant-in-aid funds." In Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420-22
(1970), the Supreme Court instructed the district court to grant the state an interval
in which to achieve compliance or to withdraw from the program. The option was
allowed because compliance without some reordering of the New York benefit provisions
would cost the state $40,000,000 per year. In most project grants, however, the grantee
may not have the option to withdraw from the federally funded program because
he has contractually bound himself to complete the project. In these cases an injunction
and a fund cut-off have different effects; the injunction can simply order the state to
comply with federal standards.2 23 G autreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (ND. l. 1968)
indicates the possible consequences if agencies do not cooperate with the courts to
fashion remedies in enforcement actions. HUD's participation in that litigation has
been criticized as ineffective. Its memorandum on the "appropriate remedy" was
"vague" and apparently delivered to the district judge on the evening before he issued
the injunction. The injunction itself was drafted entirely by the plaintiff's attorney,
who had no expertise in the housing area, and reflected a serious lack of understanding
of the problems of urban housing and development. It may therefore prove ineffective
to accomplish integrated public housing in Chicago. Comment, Public Housing and
Urban Policy: Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 79 YALE L.J. 712 (1970).
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that"portion of a federally assisted program that is not in compliance
Wfth federal standards, may persuade a grantee to comply with federal
standards. A partial fund cut-off does not bring the whole program
to a halt and is thus likely to hurt fewer innocent beneficiaries of the
program than is a total fund cut-off. Congress recognized this iri the
Social Security Amendments of 1967 when it amended various sections
in Tide 42 to authorize the Secretary of HEW to limit his withholding
of federal funds to that part of a state plan with which authorities were
not complying.2 24 Thus, if a state is not actually providing certain
social services on a statewide basis, but is only providing them in certain
geographical areas, HEW may withhold the federal funds which sup-
port those services while continuing the flow of federal funds for the
remainder of the social assistance program. 25
Federal grantor agencies may effectuate a partial fund cut-off in a
number of other ways that do not require specific statutory authority.
The most common method is the disallowance as a program or project
cost of an expenditure by the grantee that does not conform to federal
standards. This technique builds on the distinction between conformity
requirements and matching requirements. Conformity requirements
are those standards which grantees must meet in order to be eligible for
federal grants. Matchin. g requirements are those standards which grant-
ees must observe in expending money in order to receive the federal
share of, the costs incurred. The federal share of total grant costs varies
with the grant program and may be anywhere from thirty per cent or
less up to one hundred percent. If the requisitions submitted by the
grantee or other evidence uncovered by the federal agency indicate that
the grantee is incurring costs that are improper, the federal government
should not recognize these expenditures as program or project costs
and should not release the federal funds to pay for them.
Normally, matching problems arise at the audit stage, and the par-
tial fund cut-off by the federal agency takes* the form of an audit
exception to a particular expenditure by the grantee. The clearest
case for an audit exception is an expenditure by the grantee for a pur-
224S. REP. No..774, 90th Cong., 1st.Sess..(1967); US. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 2834,
3006 (1967).
2 25There is some doubt, whether these amendments authorize HEiW to withhold
funds from a particular geographic, locality in a state where, a local agency is not
complying with fedegal standards. Statutes applicable to other formula grant programs,
however, specifically authorize the federal agency to withhold federal funds from, one
locality while continuing the flow of federal funds .to. other. areas of. the state. See
grants under Title I of, the Elementary and Secondary.Education Act of 1965, 2Q U.S.0,
§ 241 (1970).
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pose outside the scope of the categorical assistance program which the
grantee seeks to qualify as a program or project cost. A unit of local
government, for instance, cannot normally designate expenditures on
highways as project costs for an urban renewal project. Audit excep-
tions are also common when a particular expenditure by a grantee
violates federal standards. If HEW auditors discover that a state wel-
fare administration has aided a dependent who is over the age limit set
by federal law for the provision of aid under AFDC, HEW will de-
cline to share the cost of payments to that dependent. HEW thus
treats the state agency's noncompliance with federal law as a matching
question rather than as a conformity question. In this way audit excep-
dons may be used on a large scale against a whole class of recurring
expenditures in an effort to change a nonconforming policy or prac-
tice2 26 At a certain point, of course, the state's noncompliance with
federal standards may become so substantial as to -raise a conformity
issue that calls for a direct withholding of federal funds. The question
of when that point is reached is a determination generally left to the
judgment of the grantor agency.227
The principal objection to audit exceptions as a device for achieving
compliance with federal standards is their post-hoc nature. The grantee
has already received federal funds and has expended them in violation
of federal standards. Remedial action may come too late and may
depend on the thoroughness of the audit. And not all grantee activities
are audited. These difficulties can be overcome if the federal agency
announces ahead of time that it will no longer recognize as project
costs certain types of expenditures by a grantee until the grantee com-
plies with federal standards.
In administering urban renewal grants HUD occasionally exercises
this advance notice to effect a partial fund cut-off. When HUD dis-
covers that a recipient of an urban renewal grant is not observing federal
standards for relocation or land acquisition, HUD may simply tell the
grantee not to spend any more money for demolition or land acquisition
activities until the matter is cleared up. If the grantee does continue to
spend money for these purposes, the expenditures incurred will not be
treated as project costs for which the federal government must provide
its matching share. This partial fund cut-off allows the remainder of
226M. DEwrmcK, TnE INFLUENcE OF FEDERAL GRAN-rs: PUBLIc AssisrANcE IN MASSA-
ciusE r 23, 208 (1970).
722 Id., at 23-24.
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the urban renewal project to continue. 2 s Alternatively HUD occa-
sionally informs an LPA that its administrative expenses will no longer
be recognized as project costs until federal standards are complied with.
Such action is potentially effective. The execution of the project con-
tinues, and the partial fund cut-off endangers principally the salaries
of the local administrators who are thus provided with a strong in-
centive to comply with federal standards.
The manner in which urban renewal projects are funded reduces
the effectiveness of the partial fund cut-off and demonstrates the diffi-
culty of fashioning effective sanctions to meet the different needs that
face the various agencies. The amount of the federal grant, which is
initially determined when HUD approves a survey and planning appli-
cation, is either sixty-six and two-thirds percent or seventy-five percent
of net project costs. Net project costs may roughly be defined as
gross or total project costs less the proceeds to the LPA from selling
project land to redevelopers. Following HUD's approval of an LPA's
survey and planning application, HUD awards the LPA a grant reserva-
tion equivalent to the amount of the grant and then advances federal
funds to the LPA for planning the urban renewal project. If the LPA
is successful in obtaining a loan and grant contract, HUD then pro-
vides the LPA with operating capital to execute the project, either by
lending money directly to the LPA or by guaranteeing the LPA's
project notes which are sold on the private money market. Every three
or six months the LPA presents HUD its requirements for operating
capital and for paying off any project notes due. HUD normally meets
those requirements by increasing the LPA's loan authorization but may,
as the project progresses, make a partial or project payment on the
grant. Since the proceeds of land disposition are not available to the
LPA until a comparatively late stage in the project, the LPA receives
from HUD in the form of loan authorizations and project payments
the equivalent of gross project costs. Most LPA's incur heavy land
acquisition and demolition expenses at an early stage in the project and
thus enjoy for the greater portion of the project's duration loan au-
thorizations substantially in excess of the grant reservation. Under
those circumstances a threat to withhold funds is somewhat empty,
because the LPA already has the funds. If the LPA terminates the
project, the federal government is already liable for more than the
grant reservation.
228 In appropriate cases, HUD restricts its fund cut-off to demolition and land acquisi-
tion activities on a particular block in a project or with respect to a particular building.
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Despite these peculiarities in the funding of urban renewal projects,
the partial fund cut-off may still serve as an effective sanction. To
obtain loan authorizations or project payments at three or six month
intervals, the LPA must itemize its cash requirements for project costs
for each budget line item. If certain costs are not recognized at this
point as project costs, the amount of the loan authorization or project
payment is reduced by what would have been the federal share, and
the locality must absorb the entire costs. The flow of federal assistance
is at least decelerated. Since LPA's generally desire to complete urban
renewal projects as promptly as possible, this slow down should encour-
age them to comply with federal standards. Furthermore, until they
do so they are forced to absorb the full cost of certain expenditures.
HUD, of course, enjoys much greater leverage when urban renewal
activities are funded on an annual-increment basis under the Neighbor-
hood Development Program. Although an LPA's loan authorization at
a given point in an action year may exceed the increment for that year,
HUD has not committed itself on the annual increments for the fol-
lowing years. Where particular activities by a LPA violate federal
standards, the costs budgeted for those activities should be disregarded
when computing the LPA's annual increment.
Part D(4)
One of the advantages of the use of a suit to enjoin grantee action
inconsistent with federal standards is the flexibility of a decree in equity.
The court may issue orders both prohibitory and mandatory and,
through careful choice of remedial action, may achieve compliance
with federal standards without disrupting ongoing programs. Part
D (4) suggests that similar powers be exercised by federal grantor agen-
cies where they are available and that they be sought in appropriate
cases by agencies which do not presently have such powers. Indeed, the
imposition of special administrative requirements or conditions on non-
complying grantees combines the flexibility of the equity decree with
agency expertise in administration.
Often an agency which administers project grants will have dis-
cretion to impose special conditions on grantees. A legal services grant
might, for example, be conditioned on the performance of particular
law reform activities. Such a condition could be imposed at the begin-
ning of federal funding or at the time of the grant's annual renewal,
should the agency determine that the grantee's performance has been
1972]
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deficient. In the latter case it would be a special administrative condi-
tion of the type recommended here.
In certain formula grant programs the existence of the special con-
dition sanction may be necessary to remove disincentives to voluntary
compliance. For example, HEW has recently made a serious effort to
enforce section 402 (a) (23) of the Social Security Act,2 9 which re-
quires that states update the standards of need in their AFDC pro-
grams. Because out-of-date standards of need are usually undervalued,
the recalcitrant grantee has every reason to prolong negotiations and
the rendering of a final decision. Every day's delay may represent a
substantial saving of state funds. Were the federal agency empowered
to require retroactive adjustments in the payments to individual bene-
ficiaries in appropriate cases, its enforcement position would be enor-
mousIy strengthened.
Additional uses for the flexible administrative sanction can easily
be enumerated in the area of public assistance. Special eligibility pro-
cedures might be required in those local welfare departments that
discourage applications. Special training programs might be required
to upgrade the abilities of service personnel. In extreme cases HEW
might require the state to administer a local welfare program directly
until the local office's operations were regularized or to institute pro-
ceedings to remove certain personnel for cause. Similar suggestions
could be made for other continuing grant programs ranging from public
housing to employment services to public highway construction. Sec-
tion 521 of the Nixon-Mills Family Assistance Plan20 would provide
the Secretary of HEW with the necessary authority to take actions
similar to the ones mentioned above, upon finding noncompliance with
federal standards.
Even without special legislative authority, grantor agencies may find
that they have authority to impose limited special administrative sanc-
tions. Virtually all agencies, for example, have authority to require
reports concerning the operations of their grantees. Where a federal
grantor agency has determined that a grantee is not in compliance with
a federal standard, it might require the grantee to report specially to it
concerning that aspect of the grantee's program. Such reports would
be designed to allow the federal agency to monitor more carefully
the grantee's activities in that particular area and to assure thereby that
compliance is achieved.
229 See, e.g., Arizona State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. HEW, 449 F.2d 456 (9th Cir.
1971);'Connecticut State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. HEW, _4g F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1971).
230 H.R. 1, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (May 26, 1971).
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Part D(5)
This part proposes the transfer of a grant, or the awarding of subse-
quent grants, to a different grantee if the original grantee violates
federal standards. Such action may not be feasible in the case of large
formula grants administered by the states, but it is often appropriate
in the case of project grants. Project grants normally last for a limited
number of years, and grantees commonly apply for a renewal of the
grant or for a new grant under the same or a related grant program.
In these situations Part D(5) proposes that the grantee's past nonob-
servances of federal standards be taken into account. Part D(5),
which in effect penalizes the grantee for his past noncompliance with
federal standards, is the counterpart to the final paragraph in Part D,
which proposes incentives for rewarding grantees who successfully
comply with federal standards.
Federal grantor agencies presently consider a grantee's past perform-
ance when deciding upon new applications for project grants, but this
is generally done internally and on an ad hoc basis. An LPA that has
successfully run one or more urban renewal projects stands a better
chance of obtaining the regional office's go-ahead for new projects than
does an LPA with a poor record. An LPA with a poor track'record
often encounters delays and lack of interest when it starts to work
with the regional office staff on the selection of another urban renewal
area and on the preparation of a Survey and Planning Application.
Part D (5) and the provision for compliance incentives should encourage
federal agencies to formalize this process and to focus their review of
past performance on the grantee's compliance with federal standards.
The complaints procedures established under Parts A and B should
provide a source of relevant data couicerning the grantee's compliance
with federal standards. If there have been no complaints that a grantee
violated federal standards, or if the complaints have been resolved in
the grantee's favor, then the grantee should receive some recognition
for its achievement. On the other hand, if there have been complaints,
and if the federal officials designated to resolve the complaints have
found that the grantee has violated federal standards, then the grantee's
past violations should be a factor weighing against approving its present
application. In extreme cases, the grant could be transferred in .mid-
project to a new grantee.
The formality which should accompany the operation of complaint
procedures should alleviate the dangers that grantees will'lose federal,
funds for political reasons or because of community disapproval *of
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a project's goals or accomplishments. These dangers have on occasion
in the past proved real. 31 To some extent such dangers will always
accompany a system of discretionary grants-in-aid. The development
of formal procedures that focus on the grantee's compliance with fed-
eral standards should contribute to a lessening of these dangers.
Other Possible Sanctions
There are other sanctions, in addition to those recommended, which
might be used to enforce federal standards. The following is a list of
those which were considered by the authors but rejected:
1. Congress might pass a statute providing that state or local officials
who wilfully violate federal standards in the administration of a
federal grant would be guilty of a civil or criminal offense and subject
to fine or imprisonment. Alternatively, the federal grantor agency
could administratively rate state or local officials on the basis of com-
pliance with federal standards in the programs they administer. These
ratings could affect the career opportunities of these officials and thus
influence their conduct.
2. Congress might pass a statute providing for the removal from
office of state and local officials who violate federal standards in the
administration of a federal grant.
3. Congress might provide by statute for the federal takeover and
operation of state and local programs receiving federal financial assist-
ance which consistently violate federal standards.
4. Congress might provide by statute that a fund be set aside from
the general revenues which would be apportioned and distributed
annually among the states on the basis of population. Federal funds
withheld from a state for noncompliance with federal standards in
federally assisted programs would be deducted from the state's share
of this fund rather than from the federal funds available to the state
in the federally assisted programs.
These sanctions are appealing because they are likely to be more
effective than those proposed in Part D. On the other hand, the first
three run strongly counter to modern notions of federalism and are
unlikely to win widespread acceptance. They are simply too harsh
and do too much to undermine the independence of state and local
231 See the description of OEO's refusal to renew a Head-Start grant to a group of
poor Mississippi Blacks, in Cahn & Calm, The New Sovereign Immunity, 81 HARv. L.
REv. 929 (1968).
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government. It would seem far better for the federal government to
scuttle the whole grant-in-aid approach and directly administer the
programs involved than for the federal government to resort to these
sanctions. These sanctions also raise difficult constitutional problems
concerning the power of the federal government to interfere in the
governmental affairs of the states. 2
The fourth sanction is revenue sharing by the backdoor. The advan-
tages and disadvantages of revenue sharing should be confronted di-
rectly and not in the context of fund cut-offs. However, if Congress
does determine to institute a system of revenue sharing, number four
may have merit. Any funds withheld from the state for noncompliance
with federal standards should be deducted from the general revenues
assigned to the state and not from the funds available to the state for
the federally assisted program in which the violation occurred. This
arrangement would assure the continuation of the program but at the
same time would induce compliance with federal standards by tightening
the purse strings. Local governmental units could be included in the
enforcement mechanism if the system of revenue sharing adopted by
Congress included the mandatory pass-through of funds to local gov-
ernment. Any funds withheld from units of local government for non-
compliance with federal standards could be deducted from these pass-
through funds.
Compliance Incentives
The final paragraph of Part D proposes to reward grantees who
comply with federal standards as an alternative to penalizing those who
do not. Compliance incentives are likely to take either of two forms.
First, the federal government could increase the federal matching share
or award an additional lump sum to grantees who fully comply with
federal standards over a given period. Second, a grantee's compliance
with federal standards on one project grant could be recognized for-
mally as a positive factor when the grantee applied for another project
grant under the same or a related program.
Incentives in the form of increased federal matching shares are
already employed in formula grants for water pollution control and
highway construction. The normal federal share for grants to munici-
palities to construct waste treatment facilities is thirty percent.2-s This
federal share will increase to forty percent if the state pays at least
232 See Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 142-44 (1947).
233 Federal Water Pollution Control Acr, 33 U.S.C. 5 1158(b) (2) (1970).
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thirty percent of the costs of all such projects in the'state. Alternatively
the;federal share .will increase to fifty percent if the state agrees to.
pay. at least twenty-five percent of ihe costs of all projects -vithin the:
state and to set enforceable water quality standards for the waters into
which'the projects discharge. Finally, the total federal grant for a
project may be increased by ten percent if the project conforms to
a comprehensive metropolitan plan. These incentives encourage metro-
politan planning and the participation by the state in funding waste
treatment plants and in setting and enforcing water quality standards.2
These incentives have had at least some effect and have been included
in modified form in the Clean Air Act of 1970.23
The Federal Aid Highway Act of 1958236 provided similarly that
states which agreed to control advertising alongside interstate highways
would receive an incentive payment of one-half of one per cent of
the cost of those portions of the system's projects to which national
advertising control standards were applied. This incentive was reason-
ably successful; twenty-five states took advantage of it.'-"
An award of an increase in the federal matching share to grantees
who observe federal standards probably cannot be implemented without
Congressional action. Furthermore, such an incentive should only be
used when compliance with federal standards is desirable but not essen-
234See Note, Federal Programs for Water Pollution Control, 1 U.C.D.L. REv. 71,
76-77 (1969).
235 Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1969) (Supp. 1972).
236 Act of April 16, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-381, § 12(c), 72 Stat. 96.
237 A)VISORY COmm'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, I FISCAL BALANCE IN THE
FEDERAL SYsTEm 62 (1967). The Highway Beautification Act of 1965, 23 U.S.C. § 131
(1966), continued the incentive to conform and further provided that any state which
did not effectively control, under federal standards, the erection and maintenance of
outdoor advertising along the interstate and primary highway systems would lose
ten per cent of its federal-aid highway allotment. An incentive grant was thus com-
bined with a partial fund cut-off. This partial fund cut-off has not been successful.
Apparently, twenty-nine states do not, at present, effectively control outdoor adver-
tising and are therefore subject to the partial fund cut-off for noncompliance with the
federal standard. Lamm & Yasinow, The Highway Beautification Act of 1965: A Case
Study in Legislative Frustration, 46 DENVER L.J. 437, 439 n 15 (1969). Enforcement of the
fund cut-off has been deferred, pending further study. Birmingham, Book Review,
70 COL. L. REv. 779, 783 (1970). The incentive approach therefore seems to have worked
better than the partial fund cut-off. But the failure of the latter may be the fault of
Coiigress, which has never appropriated any funds to pay the states the federal share
(seventy'-five per cent) of 'the' cost of removing nonconforming billboards. Further-.
more, the Department of Justice has interpreted-the Act to require each state to pay,
just compensation for the removal of offending billboards. This standard has worked
hardship on many stater which had maintained a right to remove billboards under the
police power withoutpaying for them. Lamm & Yasinow, supra.
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tial. When compliance with a federal standard is considered essential
by the federal government (as with nondiscrimination), incentives are
not appropriate; grantees should not be allowed to purchase the privi-
lege of not complying with federal standards.
